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1. Introduction 
In 2009 a practical research class of the Political Science department at the University of 
Vienna took part in the European-wide PIREDEU1 Media Study. The study was conducted 
during the three weeks leading up to the European Parliament Elections (EPE). The main 
objective was to gather data from all the major (daily) news outlets with a standardised 
coding scheme.  Being part of this class, I was given the task to code the news outlet “Neue 
Kronen Zeitung” (in Austria usually referred to simply as the “Kronen Zeitung”) and 
became interested in the critical voices directed at the European Union in the media. The 
pre-electoral coverage in Austria on the EU was dominated in the “ Neue Kronen Zeitung” 
by their support of the independent candidate Hans-Peter Martin, a strongly eurosceptical 
Member of European Parliament (MEP). A daily column was offered by Martin where he, 
in essence, accused the EP, the EC and the EU in general of working inefficiently, 
misappropriating and wildly spending public money and legislating useless policies. The 
conclusion is drawn easily that this campaign would have to be categorised as conveying a 
eurosceptic point of view. The news coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung” became the impulse 
for me to engage myself more closely with the topic of Euroscepticism. My aim in this 
thesis will be to gain knowledge on the characteristics of Euroscepticism in the Austrian 
media. Concretely, this means that I will first assess which concerns and evaluations lead to 
eurosceptic attitudes and second, whether critique is mainly directed at the EU in general 
or merely at specific policies. In the course of my research it became clear very soon that 
one of the main tasks within this field of research and this specific topic would be, to assess 
what Euroscepticism actually is. The fact that the term Euroscepticism stems from 
journalistic jargon makes it even harder to decide upon a scientific definition. In its daily 
and popular use, Euroscepticism can be employed to describe very different attitudes 
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2 
towards the EU. It is of no use to speak about Euroscepticism in a not clearly defined way, 
leaving the assumption that one draws from scientific research in a subjective, blurry space. 
What matters is what hides behind the term of Euroscepticism. It might imply un-qualified 
as well as qualified critique of the EU, the critique might be directed at different 
institutional components of the EU or at further European integration. In turn, these 
eurosceptic stances might be caused by different concerns. I will first have to focus on 
questions concerning the definition of Euroscepticism and, furthermore, the development 
of an appropriate conceptualisation to guide my empirical research.  
 
My engagement in the study of Euroscepticism has on several occasions been met with the 
assumption that by doing research in this area, one would automatically disapprove of 
eurosceptic stances. It is not my intention to do so. Sceptical attitudes might be ingredients 
of a healthy democracy; even the more so in a political system such as the EU is where most 
decisions are not taken solely by the only directly elected institution, the European 
Parliament. The reference to Euroscepticism does not have to bring with itself a tone of 
disapproval of the phenomenon in question. As concluded by Harmsen after his research 
on ‘Euroscepticism in the Netherlands’: “The Dutch will also continue to exhibit what 
Milner (2000) has termed a ‘healthy scepticism’, questioning the levels of democratic 
accountability provided by EU institutions relative to pre-existing national standards.“ 
(Harmsen, 2005: 17). Scepticism, which in its original sense means “to be thoughtful and 
inquiring in a general sense” (Tiersky, 2001: 3), can present a valuable ingredient to every 
healthy democracy as a control mechanism. But when scepticism reaches as far as to not 
fully accept the democratic political entity that is in power, then these sceptical tendencies 
might have a negative impact on the political legitimacy of the political system. When 
citizens no longer accept decisions taken at the EU-level because they no longer identify 
themselves with the Union, the future of the whole project of European integration might 
be at risk. By learning more about the concerns underlying criticism directed at the EU or 
parts of the EU, it will become possible to address these concerns and to take them into 
account when planning the future of the European integration project.  
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Citizens’ opinions can be influenced by various socio-structural factors, such as their 
economic background or their education. Amongst others, citizens rely on cues from elites, 
political parties and the media to form their opinion of the often-complex political 
processes (Steenbergen, Edwards et al., 2007: 33; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). By 
reverting to this information, it becomes easier to assess the impact these will have on their 
personal lives and to learn about the context of political decisions. In my research, I will 
focus on the attitudes conveyed by the Austrian media towards the EU and draw on the 
quantitative data collected in the PIREDEU Media Study to conduct my empirical analysis 
on the aspects of the EU which are in the focus of critique. I will evaluate the data 
according to the prior  definition and concept of Euroscepticism. Special attention will be 
paid to the coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung” which takes up an important role in the 
Austrian media landscape due to its broad range of coverage. Proportionally to the 
population of Austria, this dominance is unique in the whole of Europe. Through the 
empirical analysis, I hope to gain knowledge on the eurosceptical coverage the Austrian 
population is exposed to. What aspects of the EU are actually in the focus of critique in the 
media and which eurosceptic concerns can be found in the Austrian media? My goal will 
also be to provide a picture on Euroscepticism in the different news outlets.  
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2. Public support and the EU  
2.1 The decline of the permissive consensus 
It has become more and more apparent that the European integration project will not 
succeed if the European public does not support it. During the past few years, one of the 
biggest problems for the EU has been the lack of public support for the European 
integration project. For a long time, the elite-driven decision-making in the EU functioned 
with the approval of its citizens. A change has occured in the attitudes of the European 
public concerning the decision-making process and European integration after the Treaty 
of Maastricht. An increasing dissatisfaction with the European integration process has 
become perceivable in the population of the European Union. This tendency has resulted 
in the decline of the permissive consensus which allowed the European elites to rule 
without direct legitimation for a long time (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002; Kritzinger, 2003; 
Steenbergen, Edwards et al., 2007). “In some Member States Euroscepticism has become a 
visible and stable, albeit minority, seam running through public opinion. Across Member 
States, a whole 13 per cent think that their country’s membership of the EU is a bad thing 
according to the most recent Eurobarometer.” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002: 5). Most 
clearly this has been proven by the downturn of the constitution of the EU by the citizens 
of two of the Member States, namely France and the Netherlands (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 
2008: 1; Heidenreich, 2009: 55).  
 
For various reasons attitudes towards the EU have been changing. In the early days of the 
European Union, no democratic deficit was detected by the population, neither did the 
scientific community discuss such a phenomenon. This was due to mainly two things as 
Holzinger suggests: First, the goals of European integration were clearly defined; the 
project should mainly ensure the peace in the region, and improve the economic situation. 
As long as these two goals seemed to be achieved by the political elite, no concerns about a 
legitimacy problem were brought forward (Holzinger, 2005: 90). But since the founding of 
the European Community (EC) the concerns of the population have changed and more 
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importantly, the main goals of the EU have too. With the Treaty of Maastricht the 
development of a common economic and monetary union and the joining of the Eastern 
European Member States, the European population did not agree anymore with the pace at 
which European integration was developing. Eurosceptic attitudes began to grow (in 
literature this has been referred to as the “Post-Maastricht Blues” (Eichenberg and Dalton, 
2007)). Secondly, though some other democratic structures of the European Union, such as 
the European Parliament, were not as developed as they are now, in the Council of 
Ministers most of the decisions were taken unanimously until the “Single European Act” in 
1986. Additionally, most new legislative proposals had to be passed by the different 
national parliaments. Legitimacy thus was based directly on the governments, national 
parliaments and national elections. With further integration this system was no longer 
feasible. A more effective decision-making process had to be employed and with further 
integration EU issues could not be discussed, mainly in national parliaments within a 
national reference framework. Due to this, structures were changed, but the voices 
detecting a democratic deficit only began to rise then (Graf Kielmansegg, 2003: 50 ff; 
Holzinger, 2005: 94 ff). 
 
The functioning of the decision-making process of the EU was based for a long time on 
output legitimation, which is based on the success of the policies and the acceptance of the 
population (Holzinger, 2005: 94) (for further information on output legitimation: (Scharpf, 
1999: 6)). The political elite was sure to know the answer to what the integration process 
should look like and what the population wanted. In recent research on public opinion and 
elites in the EU, it was found that there is a gap between the perceptions of the population 
and the elites on what the future of the EU should be. One of the effects public opposition 
towards the EU has, is that “it has normative implications for the democratic credentials of 
the European integration project if a significant and growing section of the EU populace 
does not buy into the European project.” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008: 1). In the course of 
the integration process new policy areas have been put under the legal system of the EU. 
Majority voting has been strengthened in the ministerial Council and the European 
Parliament has gained power through the Treaty of Lisbon (though it has to be mentioned 
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that, in the treaty, national parliaments have also been strengthened). This all leads to the 
fact that the acceptance and the support of European integration has to be present within 
the population of the EU to legitimate decisions taken at the EU-level and to guarantee the 
unobstructed functioning of the Union. In the EU, direct legitimacy of the decision-
making process is only given partially through the EP. Most decisions concerning 
European issues are made by not directly elected officials, additionally the only directly 
elected entity, the European Parliament, is elected in national contexts and in campaigns 
dominated by national issues (Reif, Schmitt et al., 1997). As long as the state of democracy 
in the EU is not improved, to know more about the wishes and concerns of the European 
population is a question of legitimacy (while it has to be clear that the question of 
legitimacy does not solve the problem of a lack of democratic mechanisms (Katz, 2001: 
54)). The discrepancy concerning attitudes towards the future of the EU not only exists 
between citizens and the elites. Due to different and individual situations and 
developments, the way in which European integration is seen in every Member State has 
not been homogenous. This makes it important to assess the attitudes the European public 
has towards the EU and the integration process for each country individually.  
 
2.2 Support and Identity 
A problem strongly related to the lack of support the EU is suffering, is the lack of a 
common identity throughout the citizens of the European Union (Holzinger, Knill et al., 
2005). Similar to the lack of support, the lack of a common identity also has implications 
for the legitimacy of the political system. A single European demos is an indispensable 
factor to the idea of popular sovereignty, which is the key to democratic legitimacy. To 
establish a functioning democracy, it is necessary to build on a previous common identity. 
The idea of being part of a community is what leads to the acceptance of the rule of the 
majority, which constitutes the basic democratic principle (Holzinger, 2005: 98) (for 
further information on the demos and democracy in the EU see: (Weiler, Haltern et al., 
1995)). Also in the face of new challenges that the European Union is confronting, identity 
plays a significant role. One of the most recent challenges for the EU has been the 
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economic crisis and its consequences. A financial rescue plan to avoid Greece’s national 
insolvency has had the EU Member States making available billions of Euros. To tackle 
these problems “it is widely agreed that an European identity is necessary to ensure the 
legitimacy of the EU and to foster solidarity among the citizens of the EU” and that a “  
“we” feeling is necessary for the acceptance of the individual disposition to cooperate, to 
support the regime and to accept the decisions of the majority.” (Fuchs, Guinaudeau et al., 
2009: 91). Heidenreich mentions other problems the future integration of the EU could 
face, if there is no common sense of a community between the citizens of the EU. Amongst 
others, the future possibilities to develop a common foreign security are strongly 
obstructed with the need for soldiers to feel European to fight for the EU (Heidenreich, 
2009: 55), though this last concern still seems a long way off.  The development of a 
common identity is crucial for the EU for the various reasons stated. The legitimacy of the 
political system of the EU is at stake, as well as the solidarity between its citizens, which is 
necessary for a common economic system.  
 
2.3 An attempt to foster support 
The growing danger coming from stronger eurosceptic tendencies within the public has 
not gone unnoticed by the authorities of the EU. As a reaction to the growing 
Euroscepticism within the EU population and the negative outcomes of the referenda on 
the constitution treaty, the EU launched “Plan D” in 2005. The principle goal was to win 
back the faith of the EU citizens in the integration project. The main approach was 
emphasised by the name of the project, where the “D” stood for “Democracy, Dialogue and 
Discussion” (Bernhardt, Hadji-Abdou et al., 2009). Though the EU tried to learn through 
this project more about the concerns and needs of the population, Sørensen doubts the 
success of the project due to the fact, that “Plan D” was apparently developed without the 
knowledge of what actually made the EU populations sceptic and without paying attention 
to possible national differences of eurosceptic attitudes and concerns. The focus of “Plan 
D” was put on the democratic concerns of the European population, other types of 
Euroscepticism stayed unaddressed. The success of the project was thus already limited by 
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its concept, as Sørensen states (Sørensen, 2008: 17 ff). To develop concepts to strengthen 
the EU and the support of its citizens, we first have to know what Euroscepticism actually 
is and which attitudes towards the EU are brought forward within the opposition to the 
EU. ”Yet, going through the numerous studies on Euro-scepticism the reader is confronted 
with the question: ‘What kind of skepticism towards Europe are we talking about?’” 
(Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005: 224).  
 
2.4 The need to investigate Euroscepticism 
Euroscepticism has been an often-used term since it first was mentioned in “The 
Economist” in 1992 (Hooghe and Marks, 2007: 120). Others claim that the term was 
already used in the mid-1980s in “The Times” (Spiering, 2005: 125). This increased 
concern with the topic of Euroscepticism includes both, the media, but also political 
science research (Weßels, 2009: 50 ff). In the past decade, a multitude of publications in 
journals, books and conferences have been focusing on the topic of Euroscepticism. The 
amount of literature available is vast. Amongst many others, the “Opposing Europe 
Research Network” and its successor the “European Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Network”, both based at the Sussex European Institute”, have contributed various 
publications to the topic (Kaniok and Arató provide in their publication “Euroscepticism 
and European Integration” a comprehensive overview of the state of the art on 
Euroscepticism (Arató and Kaniok, 2009)). Still, the concepts and definitions of 
Euroscepticism have not been able to draw a coherent picture of the phenomenon. Even at 
the most basic, but often also most difficult task in political science research, the 
development of a generally accepted definition for the phenomenon in question, the 
scientific community has failed until now. The deeper investigation on what is actually 
critiqued and which motives drive Euroscepticism, are the key points to understanding the 
phenomenon and to develop strategies to increase public support for the EU. “What one 
population wants from integration may be what another population fears will happen.” 
(Sørensen, 2008: 15). This means that there is a necessity to learn more about the directions 
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Euroscepticism takes in every country, apart from knowing whether that country is 
euroscepticistic to a certain degree or not.  
 
2.5 Euroscepticism in Austria  
Austrian Euroscepticism has often been mentioned in public debates, as well as in political 
science research (Pelinka, 2004; Fallend, 2008). One would think that the advantages of the 
Austrian membership in the European Union are apparent. Austria lies in the heart of 
Europe, it does not have particular natural resources, which would make it independent 
from the European economic market, and neither is its cultural tradition different from 
other European countries (as it is the case with Great Britain, which always felt more 
connected to the U.S., though this is only one of the things which explains Euroscepticism 
in Great Britain). Especially in the beginning of the EU, smaller countries were given a 
stronger voice through specific decision-making mechanism in the EU; where decisions 
often had to be taken unanimously in a one-country one-vote fashion. Still, Euroscepticism 
has been very present in Austria since the beginning of the negotiations of a possible 
membership of Austria in the European Union. Enthusiasm for the European integration 
project has been low (Baryli, 1992; Pelinka, 2004; Fallend, 2008) and according to Fallend 
“a majority of people may be classified as Eurosceptics” in Austria (Fallend, 2008: 201).  
 
Austria’s relationship with the EU has been a sceptical one since the beginnings of the EC. 
This was linked to the position Austria took in the international political system after the 
ending of World War II. In 1955, Austria was able to sign its independence after declaring 
its permanent neutrality, following the Swiss example. Since then, the ‘Austrian Neutrality’ 
has been deeply integrated in the Austrian identity. This was a reason for the late 
membership of Austria in the EU, as becoming a member of the EC was considered 
incompatible with the status of permanent neutrality (Fallend, 2008: 205). In a “Le monde” 
article in 1992, Waltraud Barily outlined the various reasons which led the Austrian public 
to meet the accession to the EU with a sceptical attitude. As the major factor, Barily 
mentioned what she called the “sacro-sainte neutralité”, alluding to the symbolic meaning 
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of the neutrality for the Austrian public. But apparently this has not been the only concern 
bothering public opinion in Austria. The Green Party mainly criticised liberal market 
tendencies in the EU and that transit traffic might become incontrollable with accession to 
the EU. Austrian identity, or the past Austrian identity, also played a role in the debates 
surrounding a possible membership of Austria in the EU. Acknowledging the once 
important role Austria played in the political order of Europe, the concern was present that 
Austria would not play a role worthy of its historical past in the political system of the EU. 
On an economic or utilitarian basis, though the advantages of the accession to the EU 
could not be doubted, most of Austrian trade was dependent on countries of the European 
Economic Community; it could be predicted that the membership in the EU would foster 
the economic growth in Austria (Baryli, 1992). In the end, a majority of 66% voted for the 
accession to the EU (Austrian Parliament n.d.). In later developments, the right party 
spectrum became increasingly eurosceptic, as a result to the sanctions the European Union 
imposed on Austria. The FPÖ has been generally anti-EU, but distinctively adopted this 
position in the years from 1999 to 2003. Such a general anti-EU position implies not only 
critique directed towards specific policy areas but also the adoption of an anti-polity 
position, criticising the institution of the EU as such (Lefkofridi and Kritzinger, 2008).  
 
Eurosceptic tendencies have been detectable in Austria since the discussion of a possible 
membership in the EU. With some changes in terms of the content and the parties 
forwarding eurosceptic concerns, they have remained present. The topic of transit traffic 
has still been very present in debates of the EP election campaign of 2004 and the 
perception of the EU being a political institution closely linked to the misappropriation of 
public funds and seen as a mainly bureaucratic entity is widespread in Austria. Recent data 
has shown that 71% of the Austrian population does not trust the EU as a political 
institution. Also the question whether Austrian felt that their interests are protected 
through the EU, was assessed negatively in 50% of the cases (Picker and Zeglovits, 2005: 
237). Whilst it may be clear that the most radical case of Euroscepticism exists in the UK 
and a lot of researchers have focused on ‘British Euroscepticism‘ (Forster, 2002; Spiering, 
2005), eurosceptic tendencies in other Member States are still equally important for the 
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future of the EU and should be objects of research. The case of Austria also presents an 
especially interesting case of research. Austrian citizens have been continuously more 
sceptical about the EU than the Europan Union citizens on average. Recent Eurobarometer 
data has once again supported this picture (Hausensteiner-Obermayr, 2009). As mentioned 
above, in Austria the reasons for adopting eurosceptic stances have been various. Through 
my empirical analysis I would like to classify the type of Euroscepticism found in the 
Austrian media.  
 
2.6 Why the Media matters 
2.6.1 Mass media – an under-researched topic 
Most publications on Euroscepticism have been focusing on Euroscepticism in party 
systems (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008) or on public opinion research. Little is currently 
known on the component of Euroscepticism in the media. The word Euroscepticism 
actually stems from the media, so it seems curious that most analyses have ignored the 
phenomenon in the same. Euroscepticism in the media has been a fairly under-researched 
area, though there have been some attempts to investigate (De Vreese, 2007; Scharkow and 
Vogelgesang, 2007; Adam, 2009). The focus of most researchers though has been to find 
concepts to analyse Euroscepticism at the “micro level of citizens as well as to the macro 
level of party systems” (Fuchs, Magni-Berton et al., 2009: 20). The macro level of the mass 
media should be added to this general research focus. Thus, we will have to find a concept 
which enables us to analyse Euroscepticism in the media. Concepts that have been adapted 
to investigate Euroscepticism in party systems or within the population of the EU, are not 
necessarily adequate to employ in a study on mass media.  
 
2.6.2 The role of mass media in political communication 
Nowadays, mass media plays a central role in the communication process between political 
parties and the public, and so constitutes an important variable in the puzzle of the 
opposition to the European integration project. In Austria, only two out of ten citizens 
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claim not to follow up political media reports at all or only occasionally (Plasser and 
Ulram, 2002, p. 33). In many ways, the media not only offers a platform for the opinion of 
political parties but also acts as a control mechanism of the same. In the case of Austria a 
fact sticks out: the biggest newspaper, the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” chose to support the 
independent candidate Hans-Peter Martin with his list in the EP election campaign of 
2009, thus having had a major influence on the outcome. Already for the EP election 
campaign in 2004, Hans-Peter Martin strongly featured in the “Kronen Zeitung”, who 
offered a platform for his critique of the EU Institutions (Picker and Zeglovits, 2005: 243). 
This means, that it is not enough to analyse Euroscepticism in party systems or through 
voter questionnaires, but that the middle piece in public communication also has to be 
looked at more closely. 
 
When the questions arises which factors lead citizens and political parties to oppose 
European integration, mass media is considered a vital ingredient (Hooghe and Marks, 
2007: 119). The role mass media plays in democratic political systems has been analysed by 
Katrin Voltmer. In the democratic process, the task of mass media is to deliver information 
to the voters for them to rationally evaluate political processes.  The function of the media 
thereby is to simplify complex political processes in order for the citizens to be able to 
process the information, so they can make up their opinions with the least of efforts. This 
way, the media can also act as a control mechanism when criticising the actions taken by 
the political elites. Public communication exclusively happens through mass media. 
Political actors transfer their stances through the media which conveys their messages. 
Therefore, mass media constitutes the main source through which citizens perceive 
political information (Voltmer, 2002: 384). 
 
2.6.3 Mass media and Euroscepticism 
Menno Spiering states, with regard to his analysis of Euroscepticism in the British Media, 
that most newspapers in the UK convey the opinion that the only option for the UK is to 
get out of the EU (Spiering, 2005: 133). This may be due to the fact that the media tends to 
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simplify processes. Is it not easier to claim that the whole membership in the EU is at odds 
with national interest than to depict which policy areas exactly have been developing in 
favour of the nation and which have not? Another reason for this kind of news coverage of 
the EU in the UK is that the media tends to go for the most attention seeking stories; More 
so in recent years, with growing pressure for newspapers and TV news outlets to sell. On 
the other hand, the opinion of the media cannot depart too much from citizens’ attitudes: 
as a consequence such a radical type of Euroscepticism, as Spiering detects in the UK, 
might not be present in news outlets of other Member States. The media has to write what 
the readership wants to hear, but also influences citizens’ opinions with their sometimes 
provocative statements. In both cases the analysis of the media can bring valuable 
knowledge. 
 
Spiering claims when talking about the British press that “Euroscepticism is a resource to 
be exploited by politicians and the press alike. Many of the tabloids routinely carry reports 
about nation-threatening directives which are dreamt up not just by ‘Brussels’ but by ‘the 
Europeans’ (Spiering, 2005: 145). The opportunity is embraced by mass media to produce 
attention-calling articles. The claim that foreigners are forcing decisions made at the EU-
level on British citizens, apparently works even better, since the knowledge-level of the EU 
within the British population is lowest according to the Eurobarometer, says Spiering 
(Spiering, 2005: 139). Chong and Druckman support this line of thought, mentioning that 
citizens without sufficiently developed attitudes can be manipulated more easily and are 
thus more vulnerable to framing in the media (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 121). The 
general level of knowledge concerning political processes in the EU is relatively low in the 
rest of Europe as well (Anderson, 1998); the assumption that mass media can have a 
stronger influence on citizens’ attitudes when reporting about EU issues will thus very 
probably not only apply to the UK.  
 
Apart from the role mass media plays in shaping public opinion in general, it is also of 
importance to keep in mind the varying level of influence news outlets have in a country. It 
is necessary to have a look at the range of coverage of the news outlets of the country in 
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question. In Austria we are facing a very particular landscape of the mass media, with a 
yellow press paper nearly covering half of the readership in Austria, the “Neue Kronen 
Zeitung”. To name specific figures, the range of coverage of the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” 
reached 41.9% in 2008. In comparison, the three biggest quality newspapers “Der 
Standard”, “Salzburger Nachrichten” and “Die Presse” only reached between 3.4% and 
5.5% (Statistik Austria, 2009). My aim in this thesis on Euroscepticism in the Austrian 
media is not to analyse the effect the media has on the Austrian population. I will therefore 
not weight my empirical results according to the ranges of coverage. Still, it can be of 
interest to have the structure of this special media landscape in mind when interpreting the 
results. Taking into account though, the special position of the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” 
with respect to its range of coverage and to the strong support of the “Liste Hans-Peter 
Martin”, I will lay a special focus in my empirical analysis on the eurosceptical content of 
the “Neue Kronen Zeitung”. This will reveal the eurosceptic tendencies a majority of the 
Austrian readership of newspapers is exposed to. The analysis will also detect whether it 
can be verified or not that the “Kronen Zeitung” conveyed more critical stances towards 
the EU during the weeks preceding the EPE 2009 than other news outlets. This last 
assumption is based on a mere observation of the news coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung" 
and the support of the news outlet for a eurosceptic candidate. 
 
Another factor which influences my research and which will influence possible future 
research on Euroscepticism in the media is, that one can only analyse the media for an 
individual Member States. This is due to the fact that currently no common Europe-wide 
media outlets exist. Only a minority consumes the TV Channel “Euronews” and, within 
print news, the “Financial Times” is the only Europe-wide outlet, which is also only read by 
an elite.  The public discourse concerning European issues is limited to the national 
languages and seen from national perspectives (Holzinger, 2005: 102). As already 
mentioned, the interesting thing to learn about Euroscepticism is which differences can be 
found in the EU Member States. It is, I assume, also the lack of common media outlets, 
which leads to such distinct perspectives about the EU within the Member States. In this 
respect, it only makes sense to concentrate upon national media landscapes, not only as a 
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logical consequence to the fact that there are nearly no Europe-wide newspapers or TV 
channels.  
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3. Defining Euroscepticism 
A lot of literature has been focusing on explaining why a certain country or certain parties 
are more eurosceptic than others, therefore trying to find explanations for Euroscepticism, 
but without first assessing what Euroscepticism is and what defines it. The value of an 
adequate definition cannot be estimated high enough in the social sciences, as “one’s 
results are heavily colored by one’s definition of key terms” (Gerring, 1999: 359). A 
multitude of definitions of Euroscepticism have been put on the table, but there has been 
no agreement on one basic definition of the term Euroscepticism. “... no coherent theory 
exists that details what Euroscepticism is, or why, when, and how it occurs and develops.” 
(Sørensen, 2008: 6) or as Harmsen and Spierieng put it: “… there is clearly no single, 
accepted usage of the term ‘Euroscepticism’.” (Harmsen and Spiering, 2005: 20).  In their 
research, Harmsen and Spiering also mention that this, at the same time, is proof and a 
direct result of the vivid debate which has surged in the last years on the topic, “the debates 
surrounding questions of definition are largely the reflection of an increasingly vigorous 
scholarly interest in the nature, origins and prospects of Euroscepticism.” (Harmsen and 
Spiering, 2005: 20). Still, in any scientific research tackling the issue of Euroscepticism, the 
lack of a common agreement in literature concerning the definition of the term has to be 
mentioned. Many authors have tried to find the right definition, but it has to be discussed 
whether one of the existing definitions actually grasps most precisely the meaning of 
Euroscepticism or if a new definition should be developed.  
 
The origin of the term Euroscepticism which, as already mentioned earlier, stems from the 
journalistic sphere, makes it hard to grasp the precise usage of the word Euroscepticism. In 
mass media, Euroscepticism has been used in a lot of different ways, covering a wide range 
of attitudes towards the EU. The difficulty raised by this, lies in the fact that one of the key 
factors in coming up with a valuable definition is to grasp the meaning the term has in its 
popular use. Ronald Tiersky states in his introduction to the reader “Euro-skepticism” that 
one should not make the mistake of trying to be over precise about the term 
Euroscepticism as the concept stems from the journalistic sphere and constitutes an 
  
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
informal label rather than a formal political theory (Tiersky, 2001: 3). In a paper on the 
development of concepts, Gerring raises the concern that a concept or a definition should 
neither depart from the common usage of the term, nor should a scientific work restrict 
itself to ordinary meanings (Gerring, 1999: 362). For the validity of the scientific research, I 
will resort to definitions which have already been developed in research on the topic, and 
see whether they seem adequate or whether alterations should be made to create a better 
definition. Basing a scientific analysis on a loose definition of the term, as Tiersky suggest, 
would render the results less significant. 
 
3.1 Considerations on terminology 
Before getting to the task of presenting the definitions currently available in the literature 
and the problems related to these definitions, the components of the word “Euro-sceptic-
ism” are worth taking a look at.  
 
“Problems involved with defining the positive concept are readily apparent and emerge at 
all three components of the term: euro, sceptic and ism. From its popular usage in the press 
and in political and academic discourse, it is clear that ‘euro’ is not restricted to scepticism 
towards the Euro (single currency), nor to anything that has to do with ‘euro’; however, it 
is not straightforward to replace the term with the slightly more concrete version ‘EU-
scepticism’. While sometimes denoting sceptics of the EU as a whole, Euroscepticism is 
more frequently used in relation to specific areas of concern, such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy, or the Constitutional Treaty. ‘Sceptic’, according to dictionaries, refers 
to ‘doubt in the truth of something’ … a non-negligible part of Euroscepticism, for 
instance, aims for the complete breakdown of the Union. ‘Ism’ is the suffix attached to 
most ideology labels, lending the term to be incorporated into the domain of political belief 
systems (Flood: 3). However, whether or not Euroscepticism can be seen as an ideology in 
its own right is a topic of on-going debate (Flood & Usherwood).” (Sørensen, 2005: 2 ff.).   
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As Sørensen points out the component ‘Euro’ in the word Euroscepticism can be a 
misleading term, as Euroscepticism does not refer to the opposition to the single currency 
of the European Union. But the term Euroscepticism has been established in mass media, 
the political sphere and public discourse without being restrained to the single currency. 
Coining a new term would lead more to confusion than it would help to depict the 
phenomenon more precisely.  
 
The point that one should not depart from the common usage of a term is underlined by 
my objection to an alternative terminology of the opposition to European integration, as 
Kopecky and Mudde have developed. In their concept, principled opposition to the 
European integration project is tagged with the label of “Europhobes”. Eurosceptics, in 
contrast, are only people or parties who: “support the general ideas of European 
integration, but are pessimistic about the EU’s current and/or future reflection of these 
ideas.” (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 302) (Kopecky and Muddes’ concept divided into 4 
ideal types of attitudes towards European integration and towards the EU, which I will 
outline later in the chapter treating the conceptualisations of Euroscepticism). A critique 
from Szczerbiak and Taggart on Kopecky and Muddes’ concept is that it departs from 
common usage of the term Euroscepticism. In a popular sense, Euroscepticism generally 
encompasses both, contingent and principled opposition to the European integration 
project. Departing from these terminology-based considerations, I will proceed by giving 
an overview of the basic definitions of Euroscepticism which have been developed. 
 
3.2 Euroscepticism: The opposition to European 
integration or to the EU in general? 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary offers the following definition for the term 
Eurosceptic: “A Person who is not enthusiastic about increasing the powers of the 
European Union.” This definition has not been used in any of the scientific papers trying to 
assess what Euroscepticism is, as the definition is too broad and focuses on the lack of 
enthusiasm for European integration instead of the opposition to it. Taggart developed a 
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definition, which in comparison is much more detailed and is an often-cited definition of 
Euroscepticism in research. „Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified 
opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of 
European integration.“ (Taggart, 1998: 366). The latter definition seems more elaborate 
than the first one and has been much used in scientific research; still they both have some 
common ground. In both the Oxford English Dictionaries and Taggart’s definition, the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism is being related to the opposition to European integration 
and not to the EU in general. This leads us to one of the main discussions concerning the 
basic definition of Euroscepticism. The distinction between Euroscepticism standing for 
opposition to European integration or whether it also includes opposition to the EU in 
general and membership in the EU. Ronald Tiersky, in line with the two definitions 
mentioned above, tries to visualise the fact that, for him, Euroscepticism is the opposition 
to European integration but not Europe by outlining what would be the positive 
programme of Euroscepticism: the vision of an intergovernmental and confederal Europe 
but not national isolation. “The minimum necessary integration for peace and prosperity 
coupled with the maximum preservation of national sovereignty.” (Tiersky, 2001: 4) 
 
The alternative way of defining Euroscepticism was taken, among others, by Forster and 
Sørensen. Both not only see the opposition towards European integration as a eurosceptic 
attitude, but also the opposition to the EU in general. For Forster “generally the term 
Euroscepticism has been employed as a generic label that defines a negative point of view 
towards the European Union (EU)” (Forster, 2002: 2). This view is also supported by 
Sørensen who defines Euroscepticism “as a sentiment of disapproval – reaching a certain 
degree and durability – directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular policy 
areas or developments” (Sørensen, 2008: 6).  
 
Though Taggart’s definition from 1998 restrains itself to the opposition to European 
integration, Szczerbiak and Taggart in a subsequent paper developed a concept of 
Euroscepticism, which also included the opposition to the EU in general and to the 
membership in the EU. They proceeded by distinguishing two dimensions: Soft 
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Euroscepticism, which concerns one or a number of policy areas and displays qualified 
opposition, and Hard Euroscepticism, the latter including principled objections to the EU, 
to European integration and in consequence to the membership in the EU (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart, 2002: 7). It thus seems clear, that the term Euroscepticism has often not been used 
in a coherent way. 
 
To give insight into the vivid discussion on the matter of the definition of Euroscepticism, I 
will shortly outline a critique of the concept proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak and their 
consequent alteration of the concept. Kopecky and Mudde mentioned regarding the 
concept of Taggart and Szczerbiak that, in their opinion, the opposition to the Membership 
in the EU or the request to withdraw from the EU does not form part of Euroscepticism 
(Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 300). As a reaction to this critique, Taggart and Szczerbiak 
reformulated their concept in the following way: “our original Hard-Soft formulation, we 
would re-formulate it as follows. Hard Euroscepticism (what Kopecky and Mudde term 
Eurorejectionism) might be defined as principled opposition to the project of European 
integration, in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational 
institution such as the EU. Soft Euroscepticism (what they term simply Euroscepticism) 
might be re-defined as when there is not a principled objection to the European integration 
project transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition 
to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of 
competencies that the EU is planning to make.” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 8).  
 
In conclusion, one could say that the opposition to European integration is usually what is 
captured by the term Euroscepticism. However in extreme cases the opposition to the EU 
and to membership of the EU can also be included in the meaning of the term 
Euroscepticism. In its widest sense, Euroscepticism can be defined as critical opposition to 
the European Union in general. It is true that the future of the EU will depend on the 
commitment of the European public to the integration process and one can assume that 
most eurosceptical attitudes concern the objection to further European integration. 
Usually, the question whether a country should think of leaving the EU is not even 
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seriously considered in public discourse, still it could be a possible issue in Member States 
and more so in candidate countries. (The question was also raised by Taggart and 
Szczerbiak as to whether Euroscepticism could only exist in EU Member States and their 
answer do this was negative, stressing, that Eurosceptic forces have also emerged in EU 
candidate states (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002: 6).) As outlined earlier, most definitions of 
Euroscepticism have therefore been limited to a critique of European integration and not 
to the European Union as a whole, often using Taggart’s definition of 1998 (Tiersky, 2001: 
1; Hooghe and Marks, 2007: 120). But the approach to draw classifications which divide 
between more radical and softer variations - where the more radical types encompass the 
opposition to the EU in its entity and the membership of the EU, as in Taggarts and 
Szczerbiaks initial concept - makes sense to be able to get more precise knowledge and 
results on the research of Euroscepticism.  
 
3.3 Attitudes qualifying as euroscepic stances  
Another important issue, when trying to set limits to the phenomenon in terms of a 
definition, is to consider what these attitudes, be it towards EU integration or the EU in 
general, include. Which attitudes can be regarded as constituting an oppositional stance to 
the EU or to European integration? Common conclusions on which positions towards the 
European Union can be branded as euroscepticistic are hard to find. Harmsen and Spiering 
denote that the intensity of Euroscepticism can range from “fundamental rejections of 
European integration in its present form through to mild reformist critiques” (Harmsen 
and Spiering, 2005: 13). Guido Tiemann outlines in the introduction of his article on 
eurosceptic parties that in a provisional way Euroscepticism can be seen as the opposition 
to the ideas of the EU, its institutional structure or specific policies decided upon at the 
European level (Tiemann, 2006: 171). It is important to assess which attitudes actually fit 
the description of opposing the EU or European integration. Franz Fallend mentions in his 
contribution to Taggart and Szczerbiak that in his article “opposition to non-fundamental 
aspects of European integration will not be understood as evidence of Euroscepticism.” 
(Fallend, 2008: 202). This is a valid point, as otherwise every small critique on some aspect 
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of the EU would be categorised as a eurosceptic stance, which would render the concept 
meaningless. In the same sense, Kopecky and Mudde criticised Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 
afore mentioned definition of Soft Euroscepticism saying, that it includes nearly every 
disagreement with a policy decision made in the EU and thus is over encompassing 
(Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 300). Discussing Anthony Forsters research on British 
Euroscepticism (Forster, 2002), Menno Spiering mentions in her own article on British 
Euroscepticism that “Forster, together with many others, employs the term in a non-
specific way, as a portmanteau for every British reservation ever expressed about postwar 
European cooperation or integration.” (Spiering, 2005: 128). Though Forster’s approach 
and that of other researchers might be valuable nation-specific and historical contributions 
to the debate, I would like to avoid such a non-specific analysis of Euroscepticism. At the 
same time, I want to refrain from a rigorous limitation of the term, which would exclude 
determining characteristics of the phenomenon. Only this way will we get information on 
characteristics of Euroscepticism that will be of value for cross-national analysis. It will also 
avoid the danger of speaking of totally different phenomena altogether; a problem which 
Sørensen has observed in the literature on Euroscepticism (Sørensen, 2008: 7). 
 
 The question remains: if a party, the citizens of the EU or mass media is not against 
European integration in general and the EU’s general trajectory, but opposed to one 
particular transfer of sovereignty, this does not have to mean that this necessarily is the 
adoption of a eurosceptic stance. Where should one draw the line? How many oppositional 
stances to the extension of the EU’s powers are enough to speak about Euroscepticism? To 
solve this problem, Taggart and Szczerbiak decided to divide between the opposition to 
core and to peripheral policy areas of the EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 9). 
Euroscepticism should be limited to a broader opposition to the EU or European 
integration. This notion should include attitudes opposing major institutions, the 
democratic pillars of the political system or major policy areas (where admittedly one can 
fight about which policy areas should be considered as being major).  
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Continuing with the question, which attitudes count as an oppositional stance to the EU or 
European integration, Taggart and Szczerbiak brought forward another concern. What if 
parties (this can be extended to citizens or mass media) criticise that there is too little 
European integration? This could hardly be seen as a eurosceptic stance in their opinion. 
An example would be the case where the EU is criticised for being undemocratic or a call 
for democratisation is forwarded. Parties who call for the transfer of more competences to 
the EU-level (e.g. to strengthen the EP) cannot really be defined as eurosceptic (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart, 2003: 10). But if the democratic status of the EU is criticised, this could also be 
a call to draw competences back to the national level, which could again be categorised as 
Euroscepticism. The same problem poses itself when the critique is made that allegedly 
there is “too little social Europe”. But the critique of “too little social Europe” or the 
statement that the democratic status of the EU is in bad shape, in my opinion, also means 
that you oppose the current trajectory of the EU, which again can be classified as a 
eurosceptic stance. Weßels has discussed this definition problem of Euroscepticism by 
questioning whether scepticism can only mean absolute rejection of something or if it can 
include reasoned critique. The latter actually constitutes an important clue to the 
development of the democracy in the EU.  In his concept critique related to the call for 
improvement of the European integration process actually constitutes one main type of 
Euroscepticism (Weßels, 2007).  The truth is that this problem cannot be solved 100 
percent. If the main critique is that further integration should be pushed for, this would 
rather present a euro-enthusiast attitude; if further integration is not objected to in general 
but certain aspects of integration are criticised, this would present a eurosceptic attitude. 
The data, which would be required to differentiate between such slight nuances, is usually 
not available.  
 
3.4 The definition of Euroscepticism in national 
contexts 
Various researchers have focused on finding differences in the eurosceptic attitudes of the 
Member States of the EU (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Sørensen, 2008; Lubbers and 
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Scheepers, 2010) or focused on the specific characteristics of Euroscepticism in one 
country (Forster, 2002; Lubbers, 2008). Different contextual factors have lead to these 
changes in public attitudes towards the EU.2 According to Harmsen and Spiering the 
meaning of the term ‘Euroscepticism’ is therefore often adopted in the context of national 
political debates. Historical, political and geographic differences have shaped the attitudes 
towards the EU, which have to be understood by taking these circumstances into account. 
Concretely, they refer to the ‘British Case’ of Euroscepticism, which has proved to be 
broader and more radical than in the rest of Europe (Spiering, 2005). In the UK, many who 
advocate for the withdrawal from the European Union gather under the umbrella of the 
term Euroscepticism as Menno Spiering states. As an example he lists the Homepage 
www.euro-sceptic.org  which features supporters of the departure of the UK from the EU 
(Spiering, 2005: 129). In this spirit, British supporters of the EU membership who oppose 
further European integration, try hard not to be seen as eurosceptics. „Instead of the word 
Eurosceptic, these and similar minded activists prefer other compounds, such as 
‘Eurorealist’ or ‘Europragmatist’, to mark their position, while claiming that those who call 
themselves Eurosceptic are in fact ‘Europhobes’.” (Spiering, 2005: 130). In Britain, Spiering 
states that Euroscepticism is more radical than in other EU countries, thus it would be 
labelled in line with the concept of Taggart and Szczerbiak as Hard Euroscepticism 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002: 4). A country-dependent differentiation as Menno Spiering 
uses, makes it even more difficult to agree to a basic definition of Euroscepticism, which 
can be employed universally. It is actually one of the main challenges in research on 
Euroscepticism to find a definition, which can be employed in all Member State and 
candidate countries of the EU, having one and the same meaning. I therefore have to object 
to the development of definitions of Euroscepticism, which only apply to one specific 
country or type of Euroscepticism. In the following chapters I will outline some concepts 
developed to be able to divide a general definition of Euroscepticism into specific types of 
Euroscepticism. This approach seems more adequate to foster comparative research in the 
area than Spiering’s approach. A common basic definition of Euroscepticism is core to 
                                                      
2 I will elaborate these factors more precisely in the chapter on the contextual factors leading to the adoption 
of eurosceptic stances. 
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future research done in this area. Further discern within the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism are equally important to be able to differentiate degrees and directions of 
the opposition to the EU or European integration. In that case, it will not be necessary to 
restrict the definition of Euroscepticism to the opposition to further integration, as it is 
done in some cases in the literature I mentioned before. By creating further distinctions 
within Euroscepticism the different dimensions can be held apart. 
 
3.5 How Euroscepticism is defined in the present 
research 
When comparing some of the basic definitions developed in scientific research by 
Sørensen, Forster, Taggart and Tiersky, Taggart’s attempt to describe the phenomenon 
seems the most elaborate (Taggart, 1998: 366). To a great extent, I agree with his definition. 
The fact though, that the definition is limited to the opposition to European integration 
seems less viable. The popular use of the term Euroscepticism also includes oppositional 
attitudes towards the EU in general and towards the membership in the EU, as displayed 
by Spiering’s analysis of Euroscepticism in Great Britain. In radical cases, the meaning of 
Euroscepticism might indeed include these attitudes. As long as an accompanying concept 
provides the necessary categories to clearly divide between the different (and more or less 
radical) attitudes within Euroscepticism, I find it logical to include this aspect in my 
definition. Also some researchers argued that one could either oppose further integration 
or oppose the direction European integration has been taking in the past. The latter, for 
me, counts as opposing to the European Union in general, as the EU as a whole consists of 
measures of past integration steps.  Thus, I will reformulate the definition Taggart 
proposed as follows:  
 
Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as 
incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration, 
the European Union in general or the membership in the European Union. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
26 
Having decided upon this basic definition, I repeat that the definition of Euroscepticism 
should be limited to a broad opposition to the EU or European integration. This includes 
attitudes opposing major institutions, the democratic pillars of the political system or 
major policy areas (or as Taggart and Szczerbiak put it, the opposition to core areas of the 
EU (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 9)). 
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4. Conceptualisations of 
Euroscepticism 
Once the problems of defining the term “Euroscepticism” have been analysed and a 
conclusion about which definition best suits the term has been decided upon, the next 
difficulties for a researcher on the topic of Euroscepticism arise: Conceptualisation. Apart 
from deciding whether Euroscepticism should encompass critique towards the EU or the 
opposition to European integration, more specific conceptualisations have to be elaborated 
to be able to denote specific dimensions of Euroscepticism. It has been stated by 
researchers that there is no such thing as one kind of Euroscepticism, but the phenomenon 
encompasses different dimensions and levels of intensity. Apart from the necessity to agree 
upon a basic definition of the term in question, the task of a good concept is to enable the 
concrete analysis of the issue at hand.  
 
Similar to the quantity of different definitions of Euroscepticism, a lot of different concepts 
concerning Euroscepticism are available in current research on the topic. In past studies, 
there has been huge diversity in conceptualisations of Euroscepticism, to the point that in a 
lot of studies different phenomena have been surveyed altogether (Sørensen, 2008: 7). In 
different theoretical approaches it has been shown, that Euroscepticism has a multifaceted 
nature, which is hard to grasp. The possible explanations for opposition to the EU and to 
European integration have been searched for in economic considerations, identity based 
concerns, or the mistrust of both national and European institutions, just to mention a few 
of the approaches. The task now is to find a concept which includes all these different 
types of attitudes towards the European Union, but also differentiates between them, so 
that we can see what drives Euroscepticism and to what extent the EU or European 
integration are opposed by these attitudes. 
 
 In this chapter, I will give an overview of the concepts developed and will evaluate 
whether one of them meets my objective of finding a framework for my analysis of 
Euroscepticism in the Austrian media. The question is whether an already developed 
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concept can meet my expectations of a good concept to analyse Euroscepticism in the 
media or if a new concept would fit the analysis more adequately. In scientific research it 
should be avoided to develop a new concept if this is not necessary, as it would only add to 
the general confusion about what Euroscepticism is and which factors indicate the 
presence of Euroscepticism. The same applies to the development of definitions. But if a 
better definition or a better concept can be drafted, which either combines some of the 
already known points or adds some valid information, then one should not be afraid to do 
so. In this case, a valuable definition could be found in current literature on 
Euroscepticism, though I opted to submit it to some alterations. In this chapter I will give 
an overview of the state of the art concerning different conceptualisations of 
Euroscepticism. My own conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, as I will employ it in this 
thesis, will be presented in the following chapter after having provided an overview of 
existing concepts. 
 
Some of the concepts have already been discussed in parts of the chapter on the definition 
of Euroscepticism, due to the fact that the boundaries between the definitions and the 
concepts cannot be clearly marked. The definition forms part of the broader concept and 
the concept often influences the definition chosen. At the risk of repeating some aspects 
already mentioned, I will outline the concepts developed in the literature on 
Euroscepticism with their adjacent definitions in the following chapter.   
 
The research on the concepts of Euroscepticism led me to the observation that one should 
be distinguish between two core aspects of Euroscepticism. First, which considerations can 
be detected that lead to eurosceptic attitudes; and secondly, which objects are in the focus 
of criticism. One the one hand, this two-fold structure will lead my own concept outlined a 
bit later. For another thing, I will already have allocated the concepts which have been 
developed in the literature according to their research focus and where they belong within 
this conceptual division.  
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4.1 Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
A prominent line of research, when analysing motivations for Euroscepticism in party 
systems, has been to divide between strategic and ideological considerations. Other 
motivations underlying eurosceptic attitudes have been detected in public opinion 
research, which include rational choice approaches (e.g. cost-benefit calculations of the 
output of the EU), democratic considerations, sovereignty-based and identity-based 
concerns. Some of these, which will also in part be integrated into my own concept, will be 
outlined in greater detail in the following.  
 
4.1.1 Strategic vs. ideological considerations 
In party systems research the motivations underlying eurosceptic attitudes of parties have 
mostly been searched for in ideological or strategic considerations. (Kopecky and Mudde, 
2002: 319). Among others, Taggart and Szczerbiak have discussed such a dimension of 
“strategical” Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003). The assumption is, that 
opposition parties could employ this eurosceptic attitude to underline their position in the 
national party system. Some political parties use euroscepticistic messages as mere tactical 
moves in order to fulfil their positions as opposition parties and to act contra to the 
agreements reached by the governing parties in Brussels. It has also been found that 
throughout Europe Euroscepticism prevails in the flanks of party systems (Aspinwall, 2002; 
Hix, 2007), be it either on the left or on the right side of the party systems in question. 
Mainstream and governing parties have usually shown no connection with euroscepticistic 
positions. “Voters and parties on the extreme left and extreme right are more likely to be 
Eurosceptic than are centrist voters and parties.... those who support European Integration 
tend to support moderate and centrist policies.” (Hix, 2007: 136 ff). In other papers 
focusing on party research, it has been remarked that some parties choose to oppose 
European integration because of their nationalistic tendencies; others are ideologically 
opposed to the economic model the European Union is following (Sitter, 2002). In 
comparison to strategic Euroscepticism, it makes more sense to look for an ideologically 
rooted Euroscepticism when analysing mass media. Most news outlets prove to be 
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ideologically coloured in some kind of way.  With strategically motivated Euroscepticism 
the division made between governmental and opposition parties cannot be directly 
transferred to the media in the sense that there are no governing media outlets or 
oppositional media outlets. 
 
4.1.2 Rational choice approaches and political Euroscepticism 
In Hix’ rational choice institutionalist approach to Euroscepticism, citizens will evaluate 
whether European integration will bring them closer to their preferred policies or if 
European integration will work against their ideal position. Just by doing this calculation, 
citizens will determine whether they are Euro-enthusiastic or rather Eurosceptic (Hix, 
2007). This assumes that citizens are able to evaluate policies developed by the European 
Union, to understand which effect they will have on their personal lives and whether they 
fit their general believes. Though Hix states, in advance to this critique, that as party 
leaders and interest groups are likely to be able to estimate the effects of policies taken at 
EU-level much better than citizens, citizens “are likely to rely on ‘cues’ from parties and 
interest groups about how EU actions relate to their own preferences...” (Hix, 2007: 136). 
Cost-benefit calculations driven by a rational-choice approach are very likely to be found 
in mass media. One of the tasks of the media is to disentangle complex political processes 
and to reveal the actual effects the policies decided upon will have for certain parts of 
society. The range of aspects and policy areas of the EU that could be affected by such an 
evaluation is very wide.  
 
Lubbers and Scheepers differentiate between the dimensions of instrumental and political 
Euroscepticism. These two dimensions have already been proposed previously in literature 
on the topic.3 The instrumental approach is linked to a cost-benefit calculation of the 
                                                      
3 As initial researchers on the approach of instrumental Euroscepticism they indicate among others the works 
of: Anderson, C.J. “When in Doubt use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Policies and Support for 
European Integration” Comparative Political Studies 31 (5): 569-601, 2005,  
Eichenberg, R. and Dalton, R.J. “Europeans and European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for” 
International Organization 47: 507-5034, 1993 
And  
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membership of the Member State in question (the evaluation whether one’s own country 
had been benefitting from membership in the EU or whether it was a good or a bad thing 
to be a member of the EU). This dimension displays similar characteristics as Hix’ 
approach to Euroscepticism and is also based on rational choice theory. Political 
Euroscepticism, on the other hand, should indicate in which policy areas further European 
integration is not desired and, in their paper, is linked to the evaluation of whether 
decisions should be taken by the national government or at the level of the European 
Union. Allthough they found that indeed these two dimensions of Euroscepticism can be 
distinguished in their empirical analysis, they also showed, that in some cases correlations 
between instrumental and political Euroscepticism can be observed. Lubbers and Scheepers 
use this concept of political and instrumental Euroscepticism in their research on 
Euroscepticism among the general European public. Though Lubbers and Scheepers did 
not developed the concepts of instrumental and political Euroscepticism, or as they write it 
‘Euro-scepticism’, they combined both approaches in their paper to present different 
motivations for Euroscepticism and to give an overview of these research branches 
(Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005).   
 
For Lubbers and Scheepers, one of the main conflicts in the process of European 
integration is how to deal with the distribution of national vs. EU-level responsibilities, 
which they deal with in the dimension of political Euroscepticism.  Another prominent 
field of dissatisfaction they detected, is disagreement with the democratic process in the EU 
or, to be more concrete, the (lack of) democratic procedures. The question of political 
Euroscepticism, as outlined by Lubbers and Scheepers, rises interesting aspects, as it is 
strongly linked to the question of legitimacy of the decision making process in the EU. If 
public opinion is not satisfied with the policy areas in which decisions are taken at the EU-
                                                                                                                                                                   
As initial researchers on the approach of political Euroscepticism they indicate among other the works of: 
Gabel, M.J ”Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories”, Journal of Politics 
60 (2): 333-354, 1998,  
De Winter and Swyngedouw “The Scope of EU Government in H. Schmitt and J. Thomassen (eds) “Political 
Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union, pp. 47-73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Dalton, R.J. and Eichenberg, R. “Citizen Support for Policy Integration” in W. Sandelholtz and A. Stone 
Sweet (eds) “European Integration and Supranational Governance, pp. 250-282. Oxford. Oxford Univeristy 
Press, 1998 
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level, this naturally makes it difficult for the citizens to accept the policies adopted in these 
areas.  
 
This dissatisfaction with decisions taken at the EU-level is also connected to complaints 
surrounding the democratic process of the EU. When citizens feel that they cannot directly 
elect the representatives who make decisions at the EU-level, their decisions become less 
acceptable to the population. In a further step, one could pose the question of which 
aspects determine whether citizens of one country are more willing to accept the transfer of 
national sovereignty to the EU-level in a certain policy area than in other policy areas. 
Dalton and Eichenbergs theory of the “national difficulty” criterion suggests that if the 
problem is more likely to be solved at a supranational level, there will be less political 
Euroscepticism (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998). Considering the theories of Dalton and 
Eichenberg and De Winter and Swyngedouw (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999), 
Lubbers and Scheepers stated that they would “expect that political Euroscepticism is 
lowest for international issues, because people would profit from cooperating to solve 
problems, and it is highest for sociocultural policy issues. Moreover, we would expect a 
cumulative structure to political Euroscpeticism. So if people are Euro-sceptic on 
international issues, we also expect them to be Euro-sceptic on joint European decision-
making in sociocultural domains.” (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005: 227). 
 
Some questions concerning Lubbers and Scheepers’ concept, however, seem to remain 
untackled: What actually defines Euroscepticism for them? Can the disapproval of the 
membership of one country in the EU really be classified as Euroscepticism? Where does 
the afore mentioned critique of the democratic procedures of the EU fit into their concept? 
And is the critique of a lack of European integration, when it comes to the democratic 
process, really to be classified as a euroscepticistic stance? These are questions, which I 
have in part raised and dealt with already earlier when talking about the definition of 
Euroscepticism.  
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Though Lubbers and Scheepers’ concept has originally been designated to conduct 
research in the ambit of citizen’s opinion research, these approaches could be transferred 
without many objections to research in mass media. 
 
4.1.3 A four-dimensional model: utilitarian, democratic, 
sovereignty-based and ideological Euroscepticism 
Sørensen developed a four-dimensional model of Euroscepticism dividing it into four ideal 
types of Euroscepticism that can be found according to her research: utilitarian, 
sovereignty based, democratic and social Euroscepticism (Sørensen, 2008). These types of 
Euroscepticism refer to considerations underlying eurosceptic attitudes. Sørensen’s model 
defines the following types of opposition to the EU: 
 
 
 
Utilitarian Euroscepticism Euroscepticism can assume an economic character. This 
means that central to one’s evaluation of the Union is 
(sic!) money-based calculations-whether or not one 
perceives of benefit (sic!) from cooperation (Sørensen, 
2008: 8). 
Sovereignity-based 
Euroscepticism 
Euroscepticism can be sovereignity based. Citizens 
sharing this type of scepticism may experience the EU as 
an economically successful undertaking, but remain 
sceptical: what is decisive is that co-operation should not 
be experienced as a challenge to national sovereignity. 
Sovereignity-based eurosceptics, for instance, are thus 
likely to take issue with supranational elements of co-
operation (Sørensen, 2008: 8). 
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Table 1: Sørensen's four-dimensional model 
 
I will state in advance that Sørensen’s model will lead the first part of my empirical 
analysis. The focus therein will lie on which evaluations and concerns can be found in 
mass media that lead to the adoption of eurosceptic attitudes. The main reason why I 
decided to employ Sørensens concept is, that it is comprehensive and includes most of the 
lines of thought dealing with eurosceptic concerns and evaluations from other concepts in 
the literature and the public discussion. To show where these discussions and concepts can 
be matched with one of Sørensens dimensions of Euroscepticism, I will outline them in the 
following according to the dimension of Sørensen’s concept they are connected with. This 
will underline why these considerations should be part of a comprehensive concept of 
Euroscepticism. 
Democratic Euroscepticism A third type of euroscepticism does not predominantly 
take issue with economic calculations or sovereignity 
based concerns, instead, scepticism centres on what is 
perceived to be inadequate structures of the existent 
political ‘set-up’ – perhaps as the result of feelings that 
one’s voice is not being heard, or that the European 
Parliament does not have sufficient weight. It may be 
labelled democratic euroscepticism (Sørensen, 2008: 8). 
Social euroscepticism Finally, a fourth type of scepticism is more political. 
Here, the EU is evaluated according to broadly the same 
cleavages that characterise national politics. In other 
words, if one is a socialist, one may be sceptical towards 
initiatives launched by a liberal Commission President, 
and reverse. Based on the existing literature, I expect, that 
the dominant form of ‘political euroscepticism’ today is 
‘social’, that is the critique that there is too little Social 
Europe (Sørensen, 2008: 8). 
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Utilitarian Euroscepticism 
The utilitarian research approach has been prominent when trying to detect possible 
evaluations and considerations, which can lead the European public to adopt eurosceptic 
stances. Hix’ concept is entirely based on rational choice theory. Lubbers and Scheepers 
also provided a dimension of utilitarian Euroscepticism in their concept as the so-called 
utilitarian dimension; in Sørensen’s model, it can be compared to the instrumental form of 
Euroscepticism. Supporting the utilitarian research approach, Hooghe stated that elites and 
citizens would desire Europeanisation if and when it was functional (Hooghe, 2003: 287). 
The question remains whether ordinary citizens can adopt such benefit-cost analysis. 
However in the case of media research, it has to be considered that it is exactly the task of 
the media to disentangle the complex political processes at the EU-level. The aim of the 
media is to provide their customers with simplified information. Through this process, 
citizens are supposed to be able to make up their minds about the political events with less 
effort. The utilitarian type of Euroscepticism might thus present an important part of the 
eurosceptic news coverage in the media. 
 
Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
The dimension of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism has been addressed in most of the 
general discussions surrounding Euroscepticism, but can also be found in concrete 
concepts of Euroscepticism. For one thing, sovereignty based Euroscepticism, as it is 
denoted in Sørensens research, has a very similar structure to the dimensions of political 
Euroscepticism in Lubbers and Scheepers research, as outlined previously. Furthermore, 
Lubbers and Scheepers themselves mentioned Gabel’s scientific analysis (Gabel, 1998), 
which dealt with this same issue, concerning the reluctance to transfer power from the 
national-level to the EU-level. “Gabel (1998) investigated whether support for European 
integration (measured by membership evaluation) was associated with evaluation of four 
policy areas to be decided by the national government or jointly by the EU, i.e. political 
Euro-scepticism.” (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005: 224). The mentioning of Lubbers and 
Scheepers concept and Gabels research alone would sufficiently prove that sovereignty-
based concerns should be included in every comprehensive analysis of Euroscepticism. But 
also general observations of the developments concerning public opinion and the ceding of 
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responsibilities to the EU-level support this. Though, Lubbers and Scheepers suggested that 
sovereignty-based concerns have been present from the beginning of the integration 
project (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005: 224). In general sovereignty-based concerns were 
not the focus of critique in the European public in the early days of the EC. The main aim 
of the integration project, in those days, focused on the integration of a common market. 
The principle goal was not yet that of political integration. Therefore, the amount of 
policies which were submitted to the decision making process of the EU was clearly 
limited. Also the decision making process as such relied for the most part on the direct 
representatives of the Member States and the legitimisation of the national parliaments, so 
that political power remained for a big part in the hands of national entities. This has now 
changed drastically and European institutions and mechanisms have decided most of the 
legislation adopted at the national level. The integration process has also shifted from being 
merely market-oriented to always covering more policy areas, therefore offering a target 
for the concerns surrounding the questions of national sovereignty. Especially in Austria, 
sovereignty-based concerns were already the focus of sceptical attitudes towards the 
European Union since the debates about a possible membership of Austria in the EU. 
While in other countries the sovereignty based concerns had not been the focus of critique 
in the early days of the EU, in Austria this aspect was brought up very early through 
debates about the neutrality status of the Austrian state (Baryli, 1992; Pelinka, 2004). The 
concern was big that membership in the EU would contradict the neutrality status as 
decisions would no longer be taken solely by the Austrian state. The reasoning was that in a 
future development of the EU also as a political community could affect areas falling under 
the neutrality pact such as military defence. Thus, in many ways, sovereignty-based 
Euroscepticism has been the focus of research conducted on Euroscepticism and 
constitutes part of the debates of the future of the European integration process 
(integration meaning nothing else than the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU-
level.) 
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Democratic Euroscepticism 
The dissatisfaction with the state of democracy in the EU has been made responsible by 
some for the lack of support the EU is suffering. “Both systematic and social background 
explanations imply that there is a widespread crisis of legitimacy in the EU, there is little 
that pro-European leaders can do to overcome this phenomenon. In this regard, low 
support for the EU may reflect a general crisis of public confidence in governance…” 
(Norris, 1999: 84). Whether it might be due to the lack of knowledge about the EU 
institution and its democratic process or to qualified concerns, there is no doubt that some 
of the critique on the EU focuses on its institutional structure and the democratic process. 
As Felix Heidenreich puts it, “The EU officials themselves often describe the problem as a 
gap between the imagined undemocratic bureaucratic monster in Brussels on the one 
hand, and the actual EU-institutions working efficiently and on the basis of democratic 
legitimacy, on the other.” (Heidenreich, 2009: 55). Some would not agree with the 
statement that the EU works efficiently and on the basis of democratic legitimacy. In effect, 
it seems like a miracle that such a community of 27 countries, which in principle all have 
their own legislature and governments, should be working. This gap between the citizens 
and the elites of the EU can result in two concerns related to democracy in the EU. Citizens 
might not feel informed enough of the decisions taken at the EU-level and thus do not feel 
that these decision should have an impact on their lives (Heidenreich, 2009: 55).  
  
Similar to the doubts surrounding social Euroscepticism, also democratic Euroscepticism 
has been subjected to the critique that in fact the request for a stronger democratic set-up 
cannot be considered a eurosceptic stance. Nonetheless, I advocate the inclusion of this 
critique, as the objection to the democratic status of a political system is one of the major 
and crucial factors of support without which a political and democratic system cannot 
function. The call for a reform or a refinement of the democratic instruments might still go 
hand in hand with the call to withdraw from such a political system, to which one cannot 
give one’s consent. At least, this could result in a call to not increase the powers of such a 
political system, which would equal the opposition to further European integration.  
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Ideological Euroscepticism 
In Sørensen’s concept, what is initially denoted as political Euroscepticism, concretely 
adopts the form of social Euroscepticism. In the following I will refer to this specific type of 
Euroscepticism also as ideological Euroscepticism. This term, for me, depicts more 
accurately its meaning than the term political Euroscepticism, which in my opinion is too 
imprecise and has also already been used in other ways (Lubbers and Scheeper, 2005). The 
basic suggestion of Sørensen is, however, accurate. It is very possible that the EU might also 
be evaluated by traditional ideological cleavages.  
 
The EU has taken a rather (neo-) liberal turn and thus the main ideological critique would 
be that there is “too little social Europe”. Since 2005 an even stronger neo-liberal tendency 
within the EU has been detectable. The constitutional treaty was opposed by a not so small 
part of the EU population. A closer investigation into the grounds on which this happened 
was not given enough attention by elites. The main chorus was that the results of the 
referenda were strongly connected to national political debates. A closer look in research, 
however, revealed that 2/3 of the people in France and in the Netherlands who opposed the 
adoption of an EU-wide constitutional treaty, came from the left side of the political 
spectrum. Their main concerns were that social politics did not find enough attention in 
the treaty. In an attempt of a revival of the constitutional treaty, Merkel even proposed to 
keep the original treaty text but to amplify it by a “declaration on the social dimension of 
the EU” (Klein and Kleiser, 2006: 7). Heidenreich discusses the issue of, why the approach 
of a social Europe has especially been brought forward by the French who wanted to extend 
their (social) economical model. “This position is very important in France and it was 
communicated in a very successful way by Pierre Bourdieu in the late 1990s already. 
“Donner un sens à l’union – Pour un mouvement social européen” was the title of an 
article in Le Monde by Bourdieu (1999). He claimed that the EU would only make sense as 
a model in opposition to the American neo-liberalism. … The core problem is that citizens 
in countries like the UK have completely different ideas concerning the role of the state in 
economic matters. The proposition is clearly a case of drawing an outside line and, in some 
cases, reifying the other, in this case the “neo-liberalism”.” (Heidenreich, 2009: 67). 
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Apparently, citizens in France and in the Netherlands did not forget that, as Heidenreich 
suggests, Europe has been proposed as a model for social standards. 
 
Not only in public opinion but also in party systems research, ideological considerations 
have been made responsible for eurosceptic attitudes. “According to one line of thought, 
political parties assimilate the new issue of European integration into their historically 
rooted ideologies. Social Democratic parties are, on the one hand, opposed to economic 
integration which intensifies competition, privileges mobile capital over immobile labour, 
and threatens the national welfare state; on the other hand, they favour political 
integration, which offers prospect of a kind of ‘Euro-Keynsianism’.” (Fallend, 2008: 203).  
Taggart, on the other hand, found no relation between the ideological roots of parties and 
eurosceptical positions. Instead, Taggarts conclusions were that Euroscepticism is a way for 
parties to express their dissatisfaction with the mainstream. These mostly opposition 
parties would revert to Euroscepticism as a strategic measure (Taggart, 1998). This would 
suggest that ideological concerns are no core motivations for the development of a 
eurosceptic profile for parties. Which ever way it may be, the dimension of ideological 
Euroscepticism has to be taken into account, so as not to oversee a possible concern 
directed at the European Union and the integration process. 
 
Though ideological or social Euroscepticism has been an often-mentioned approach in 
party-system research, the same considerations could be found in news coverage in mass 
media. News outlets could focus on declaring that the EU in general, further integration or 
specific policies should be objected to as they represent the outcome of an ideologically 
coined political entity. That news outlets and journalists themselves are not always 
reporting free from any ideologically dispositions makes this a likely occurrence.  
   
Concerning Social Euroscepticism, I will not fail to again mention the doubts forwarded in 
the scientific community whether this type of critique on the EU can, in fact, be considered 
as a eurosceptic stance. I have already done so, addressing the definition concerns on 
which attitudes can be regarded as eurosceptic stances. The question is whether the request 
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for a stronger presence of the EU concerning the task subjected traditionally to the social- 
or welfare state is, in fact, a request for stronger integration. This request might, however,  
often be less aimed at a stronger integration as to the realignment of the current economic 
integration. This stance might lead to the objection to further integration as long as neo-
liberal tendencies can be discerned or to the objection to the EU as a whole, which can be 
clearly denoted as a eurosceptic stance.  
 
4.1.4 Identity-based concerns 
In the literature the fact has been outlined that in some cases the fear to lose ones national 
identity in the course of European integration has been a source for eurosceptic tendencies. 
Speaking, for example, of the ‘why’ of British Euroscepticism, Menno Spiering talks of the 
important role which national identity played for the development of anti-EU feelings 
within the British population. This alludes to the apparent ‘otherness’ felt by Britains, 
whether this is due to the closer cultural ties with the US or to historical events such as the 
former existence of GB as a major colonial power. But not only in the UK has the concern 
about national identity been a major topic in the public discourse about the EU. In some of 
the more recent Member States of the EU similar tendencies have been observable in the 
national campaigns of the governments to join the EU (Bernhardt, Hadji-Abdou et al., 
2009). This dimension of identity-based concern admittedly exposes a weakness of 
Sørensen’s concept, as it does not include a similar aspect. For me, these concerns cannot 
be ignored and might represent an important source for scepticism towards the EU.   
 
4.2 The objects of critique 
In the following I will outline two lines of research, which both propose to distinguish 
between different types of Euroscepticism according to the object at which the critique is 
directed at. There is, on the hand, the opposition to fundamental aspects of the EU and the 
general rejection of European integration. On the other hand, there is the type of 
opposition towards the EU which focuses on rejecting further European integration and 
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critiquing specific policies of the EU. A third line of research developed by Weßels will be 
outlined in this chapter. This third approach is based on the existence of European identity 
as a dividing factor between different types of Euroscepticism. The types of Euroscepticism 
remain either more general and rejecting European integration altogether or only calling 
for improvement whilst being in general in favour of European integration. 
 
4.2.1 Diffuse and Specific Support  
In their analysis Kopecky and Mudde make a division between diffuse and specific support 
for the European Union. This conceptualisation is derived from Easton’s theory of diffuse 
and specific support for political systems. Kopecky and Mudde adopted it to the European 
Union by building a matrix consisting of a europhile and a europhobe position as well as a 
EU-pessimist and a EU-optimist axis. 
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 (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 303) 
 
With this concept, Kopecky and Mudde claim that the definition of Euroscepticism will be 
less exclusive but more precise. They specifically emphasise the fact that it is important to 
distinguish between support for European integration in general and support for the way 
in which the EU is currently developing. In their paper (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002) the 
concept is extensively outlined. The approach for this model is actually based on support 
for the European Union, but through the europhobe axis, Euroscepticism can be measured 
and the concept has been used by Kopecky and Mudde to do so.  
 
The attempt to employ Easton’s theory of specific and diffuse support to conceptualise 
Euroscepticism should be appreciated, but I agree with Taggart and Szczerbiak’s critique 
that Kopecky’s and Mudde’s terminology “departs from the existing common usage of the 
term Euroscepticism by confining it to a sub-set of what would generally be considered 
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Eurosceptic attitudes” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 5). Again, I will relay on Gerring and 
his specifications on the basic characteristics a good concept should display. One of the 
main focuses when developing a concept and defining its key terms, should be the reliance 
upon the norms of established usage (Gerring, 1999: 362). Kopecky and Mudde state 
themselves that within the wide range of terms that have been used to describe negative 
attitudes towards EU integration, the term Euroscepticism is the most common one 
(Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 299). Most of the negative attitudes towards the EU, Kopecky 
and Mudde describe, thus have been gathered usually under the umbrella of the term 
Euroscepticism. Additionally, such a typology differentiating very precisely between 
slightly different attitudes becomes very difficult to operationalise as Taggart and 
Szczerbiak outline (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003: 6). The data available often does not 
allow for such detail, even if one would decide to approve of this concept. This objection is 
supported by Gerring’s general consideration on the quality of a concept in the social 
sciences, where he emphasises that the definition and the identification of attributes of the 
same phenomenon have to provide the conditions to locate examples of the term (Gerring, 
1999: 363). 
 
Weßels employs, similarly to Kopecky and Mudde, Easton’s theory of specific and diffuse 
support. The interpretation of Easton’s theory applied to the political system of the EU 
results for Weßels in three types of Euroscepticism: the adamant eurosceptics, the 
eurosceptics, and the critical Europeans (Weßels, 2007: 288). The deciding factor between 
the types of scepticism in this concept is whether there exists a European identity or not.  
Weßels argues that “European identity as a core element of political community could 
serve as such a buffer against scepticism”(Weßels, 2007: 288). Identity divides between 
eurosceptics, which are in principal in favour of European integration and identify with the 
EU but demand improvement, and eurosceptics objecting to further European integration 
or to European integration in general.4  
                                                      
4 In the present study it will though not be possible to check for this independent variable, as the Codebook 
used in this media study does not provide the data to determine whether an article or news story conveys the 
idea of a European identity or not. It would have to be investigated whether this variable can be tested at all 
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4.2.2 Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
To distinguish between the types of Euroscepticism mentioned in the definition, Taggart 
and Szczerbiak developed a concept dividing into what they term as Hard and Soft 
Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism is defined as a phenomenon “where there is a 
principled opposition to the EU and European integration. This may even include the 
opposition to the membership in the EU or the claim to withdraw from the EU in the case 
of Member States of the EU.” (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002: 7). Soft Euroscepticism in 
contrast is defined as an attitude towards the EU which criticises specific EU policies or 
where “ ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory” (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart, 2002: 7).  
 
Taggart and Szczerbiaks’ definition of Hard Euroscepticism and the concept as a whole is 
directly linked to party systems research. They stress that Hard Euroscepticism means that 
a party is a single issue anti-EU party and thus opposes to the EU in principle. As a possible 
explanation for these single-issue parties but also for other parties that might oppose to the 
EU in general, they mention ideology-based considerations. Though, their first condition 
to demonstrate Hard Euroscepticism (being a single issue anti-EU party) can only be seen 
in the context of party systems research, the underlying consideration could also be found 
in mass media. To detect a news outlet in mass media whose issues or contents are solely 
linked to an anti-EU attitude, as a pendant to a single-issue party, is unlikely. At least in 
Austria one can say without further analysis that no such news outlets can be found. In 
contrast, the suggestion that for some journalists or news outlets the EU might constitute 
an enemy a-priori due to ideological concerns could fit the coverage of mass media too. 
Soft Euroscepticism, in contrast, includes for Taggart and Szczerbiak the kind of 
opposition where scepticism is concerned with the way in which European integration is 
                                                                                                                                                                   
in mass media research, and if news stories explicitly convey that a European identity is either desirable or 
not.  
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developing. This would mean that a party (and, as I would suggest, a person or mass 
media) is displaying Soft Euroscepticism where further steps of integration are rejected, as 
well as the way in which European integration is developing.  
 
In subsequent publications on the topic, Taggart and Szczerbiak adjusted their concept of 
Hard and Soft Euroscepticism. In their revised concept, Taggart and Szczerbiak decided to 
differentiate between the principle opposition to transferring power to a supranational 
institution and the opposition to further European integration (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 
2003). They thus excluded opposition to the EU in general and to membership in the EU 
from their concept of Euroscepticism. Their argument to do so was that this kind of 
opposition usually only reflects a “conjunctural-opportunistic stance” which often is short-
lived (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003). We have to consider, however,  that this concept has 
been developed mainly for research in party systems. Such radical points of view might 
indeed only be used by parties before referenda on EU subjects, before the accession of a 
state to the EU or in rare cases where single-issue anti-EU parties emerge. The same 
cannot, for the time being, be said for research in mass media, as no such research has yet 
been conducted and no results on the characteristics of Euroscepticism are available. In 
mass media, such radical views might be part of the coverage on the EU regularly. Also, I 
would consider the principle objection to ceding power to the EU as, in fact, being against 
the EU and the membership in the EU. The EU consists as such out of integrational steps, 
which have been taken in the past. Altogether, I will argue to include the more radical anti-
EU attitudes in research on Euroscepticism for the various reasons stated. This requires, 
however, a strict differentiation between more radical and softer types of Euroscepticism. 
No possible dimension of the opposition to the EU should be excluded beforehand. 
Therefore, the original formulation of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism is more convincing.  
The obvious conclusion of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s concept would be that the attitudes 
counting as Hard Euroscepticism present a bigger menace to the integration project of the 
EU than Soft Euroscepticism. On a second glance though, it could also seem as if, in fact, 
the opposition to further European integration might present a bigger menace to the EU 
than the objection to the EU in general. The possibility that an EU Member State might 
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actually resign from the EU is very unlikely. An article in “The Economist” of September 
2010 proposed: there was not even a legal way to depart from the EU before the more 
recent regulations in the Lisbon treaty and in practical terms it still is nearly impossible to 
leave the EU. Or as the same article cites a Eurocrat, the EU “is not a club but a family—a 
Maltese one, with no divorce.”(Economist, 2010). In contrast, the future of the EU is 
actually very dependent on the support of the public for further European integration. The 
direction European integration might take in the future is indeed a matter of discussion 
and can come to a halt when objected to or proceed when supported. It has to be kept in 
mind nonetheless that if someone opposes to the EU in general, this usually includes the 
opposition to European integration and further integration as well. In contrast, if someone 
“only” opposes further integration this might be due to the current trajectory of the EU, 
therefore this attitude might change if the course the EU has been taking does too. Also, if 
only further integration is objected to, at least, this still legitimises the EU handling policy 
areas were the transfer of power to the EU-level already happened. In conclusion, the 
categorisation of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism seems adequate.  
 
 4.3 Contextual factors leading to the adoption of 
eurosceptic stances 
In research on Euroscepticism, not only the concepts distinguishing between different 
kinds of Euroscepticism have been developed but also have been made efforts to match 
them with contextual factors.  
 
 Pippa Norris examined different explanations for variations in support for the EU 
“including the role of cultural, social background, performance- and leadership-based 
factors.” (Norris, 1999: 74). At a cross-national level some focused on whether economic 
conditions determine alternative attitudes towards the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993), 
others analysed the correlation between a low opinion of the quality of national institutions 
as an incentive to transfer powers to the EU (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). When trying to 
assess the contextual factors which lead to different attitudes towards the EU, two 
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additional lines of research can be discerned. One proposes that citizens’ attitudes towards 
the EU are directly shaped by the performance of the EU and the evaluation of the same by 
citizens. The second one argues that citizens use the nation-state as a proxy to determine 
their opinions on the EU, as their knowledge of the EU is insufficient. Both lines of 
research have been dealt with and analysed by Sylvia Kritzinger (Kritzinger, 2003). Other 
theories have suggested that lower classes would be more strongly opposed to market 
integration because they would e.g. fear international competition5 or that these tendencies 
could be ascribed to the fact that lower social classes would not profit as much from the 
right to the free movement of people.  
 
The principle reasons to adopt a certain style of news coverage can be multiple: economic 
considerations (by taking into account certain tendencies within the population and trying 
to secure a majority of the readership by reporting in their spirit), ideological 
considerations (news outlets might be, in principle, inclined either to the left or the right of 
the political spectrum) or moral considerations (as the intention to report in the most 
objective way possible, thus offering the reader the most objective ground to evaluate 
political events). Also, it is not clear whether mass media rather follows citizens’ attitudes 
or whether it is the other way around (though probably the influence works both ways). 
Theories offering explanations for Euroscepticism in mass media, as well as the necessary 
data to conduct such analyses, have proved to be a missing ingredient. Thus, I will limit 
myself to conducting a descriptive analysis of the types of Euroscepticism displayed in the 
Austrian media. The knowledge of which attitudes are communicated by the media will 
still present an informative contribution to the puzzle of Euroscepticism in general and in 
the media in particular. 
 
                                                      
5 References for this line of research can be found in Brinegar, Adam P. and Jolly, Seth K. (2005) "Location, 
Location, Location: National Contextual Factors and  Public Support for European Integration." European 
Union Politics 6(2): 155-180.  
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4.4 A comprehensive concept of Euroscepticism 
All the concepts presented in the previous chapter convey valuable points, which should be 
considered when conducting research on Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism appears to be a 
very broad phenomenon with various dimensions. In my empirical analysis I want to 
include as many facets of Euroscepticism as possible, to be able to draw a detailed picture 
of the characteristics of Euroscepticism in Austria. How does Euroscepticism present itself 
in the Austrian media? Which types of Euroscepticism dominate in the public discourse in 
Austria? The above outlined concepts have been used in scientific research individually, 
but should also be included in a bigger picture of Euroscepticism. 
 
Two basic questions stood out for me while attempting to conduct research on the topic of 
Euroscepticism in mass media. First, which concerns and considerations underlie 
eurosceptic attitudes and thus constitute types of Euroscepticism? Secondly, which are the 
specific entities (such as Institutions or the EU in general) and political processes (specific 
policies or further European integration) the critique is directed at?  
 
With the first question I want to investigate the eurosceptic considerations and concerns 
leading to opposition to the EU or to specific aspects of the EU. Which evaluations are the 
most dominant when eurosceptic attitudes are adopted? Which concerns and evaluations 
lead in the case of the EU to assume a critical stance? Sørensen’s framework presents, for 
me, the most appropriate model to do so. Most other approaches, when it comes to the 
question “On what grounds is the EU being critiqued?”, are included in Sørensen’s 
comprehensive concept. Other concepts dealing with eurosceptic concerns, as Hix’ rational 
choice model and Lubbers and Scheepers’ model of instrumental and political 
Euroscepticism are included in Sørensen’s concept. The utilitarian dimension of Sørensen 
can be compared to Hix’ approach as well as to Lubbers and Scheepers’ dimension of 
instrumental Euroscepticism. Sovereignty based Euroscepticism in Sørensen’s research has 
a very similar structure to political Euroscepticism in Lubbers’ and Scheepers’ concept.  
The main considerations of each of the dimensions developed by Sørensen have been 
addressed also in general discussions on the public support of the EU and the EU 
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integration project. Where these discussions coincided with one of the dimensions of 
Sørensen, I outlined them in the previous chapter. Sørensen’s model covers most of the 
characteristics of Euroscepticism which have been discussed in the literature. One aspect 
missing in Sørensen’s concept are identity-based concerns.  
 
A limit has to be put nonetheless on the analysis of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism. As 
cited earlier when discussing Lubbers and Scheepers’ concept, Dalton and Eichenberg 
developed the theory of the national-difficulty criterion as one of the factors that 
determines whether citizens feel that issues should be decided at the national or at the EU-
level. Whereas Lubbers and Scheepers state that they “expect that political Euro- scepticism 
is lowest for international issues, because people would profit from nations cooperating to 
solve problems” (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005: p. 227), I think that the objection to further 
integration can only be denoted as conveying a eurosceptic stance if the issue in question is 
of international nature. The political-level at which certain issues should be decided is 
often not evaluated from a rational point of view. But it has been assessed that there are 
certain issues of international nature, which, from a rational point of view, should be 
handled at an international level. Thus, I will consider the opposition to cede power to the 
EU in issues of apparent international nature as a eurosceptic stance, in contrast, issues 
which are not of international character will not be included in my analysis of sovereignty-
based Euroscpeticism. If, on a rationally based evaluation, issues are considered only of 
national concern, the desire to keep them at the national level cannot be considered as 
denoting a eurosceptic stance. It is debatable which issues should, from a rational point of 
view, be decided at the national level, but though there have been attempts to categorise the 
policy areas (Sinnott, 1995; De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999), “there is no consensus on 
the range of problems that . . . belong to the remit of local, regional, national, European, or 
international governance” (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999: 51). In my analysis of 
sovereignty-based Euroscepticism, I still will only include issues of apparent international 
character (this also should be considered in Taggart’s and Szczerbiak’s concept and 
Kopecky’s and Mudde’s concept, which both include in their definition of Euroscepticism 
the objection to European integration). 
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The second question is dealt with in Taggart and Szczerbiak’s as well as in Kopecky and 
Mudde’s concept. Which institutions or processes of the EU are in the focus of critique? I 
will use the approach of Taggart and Szczerbiak to analyse whether the EU in general, the 
institutions of the EU or specific EU policies and further European integration are 
subjected to critical attitudes. This will give us some insight on whether the basic principles 
and the pillars of the EU are rejected or ‘merely’ specific policy outcomes. The first two 
types of Euroscepticism fit into the category of Hard Euroscepticism, developed by the 
above-mentioned authors; the latter represent the category of Soft Euroscepticism. For 
reasons stated before when discussing Taggart and Szczerbiak’s concept, Hard 
Euroscepticism presents a bigger threat to the future of European integration and the EU 
than Soft Euroscepticism.  
 
Tough the principle considerations of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s and those of Kopecky and 
Mudde’s concept coincide, I will rely on the categories developed by the former for my 
analysis. The conceptualisation of Euroscepticism as Kopecky and Mudde sketched it, only 
categorises a small part of the oppositional attitudes towards the EU under the umbrella of 
the term Euroscepticism. The terminology they used introduced a whole range of other 
terms apparently representing such attitudes, as one can see in the previous outline of their 
concept. Apart from this more concrete embodiment of their ideas, the core intent also is 
to distinguish between attitudes objecting to the European Union or the integration 
process as such, or to ceding sovereignty in specific policy areas and the way in which the 
EU and the integration process are developing. Their basic efforts still form part of my 
research but the actual concept will not.  
 
As stated in the chapter on the definitions of Euroscepticism, I will also include in the 
category of Hard Euroscepticism the opposition to the EU in general and to membership in 
the EU.  In public discourse, this specific implementation is not excluded when talking 
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about Euroscepticism.6 Still, we have to avoid mixing these attitudes when conceptualising 
Euroscepticism and the distinction between the rejections of the EU in general and 
opposing further European integration is important.  
                                                      
6 Also, as already mentioned earlier: Additionally, the distinction which Taggart and Szczerbiak draw 
between the objections to European integration through the EU per se and to the membership as such or to 
the EU in general, is confusing. When someone is objecting to European integration this could mean that he 
is against every further integrational steps. In this case, the term would be limited in its meaning and would 
not necessarily lead to the objection of the EU as a whole. But in public discourse, the statement that 
European integration has already gone too far is also common. This would mean that also the past trajectory 
of the integration project is objected to and would, in effect, in its most radical form equal the objection to the 
EU in general, as the EU is the sum of the integrational steps already taken. 
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The concept drafted includes most of the aspects of Euroscepticism mentioned in relevant 
literature, as well as the three main fields of research: party systems research, research 
concerning citizen’s attitudes and mass media research. The former two areas of research 
have already been dealt with more extensively, though no research has been conducted in 
any of these three lines considering all these different dimensions of Euroscepticism. 
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As one can see, the different types of Euroscepticism do not differ within in the main areas 
where research on Euroscepticism can be conducted. This has two reasons: the most 
important one is the fact that all of the dimensions actually fit into the three fields of 
research. Some dimensions of Euroscepticism might tend to be stronger in one of these 
research fields and weaker in another one, but all of these are considerations and attitudes 
that can be theoretically adopted either by parties, individual citizens or news outlets. 
Apart from this reasoning, with regard to contents, it presents a gain for the investigation 
in question when one coherent definition and concept can be agreed upon. I have already 
pointed this out previously speaking of the problematic situation in the research field of 
Euroscepticism, where a vast variety of definitions and concepts can be found. This has led 
to a situation where no comparative research is possible and, in the end, different 
phenomena have been surveyed altogether, as Sørensen states (Sørensen, 2008: 7). With 
this inclusive model, direct comparative research could be conducted between research in 
party systems, mass media and within the micro-level of the EU citizens, not to forget that 
this model can also be employed for every country in the focus of interest. 
 
The, for my empirical analysis, relevant parts of the above drafted model are framed, as 
there are aspects which in this thesis will not be the focus of research. For one thing, I will 
limit myself to the analysis of the mass media in Austria, as every more broadly designed 
research including the attitudes of political parties or citizens’ opinion would require a 
huge amount of data. The same applies for my restriction to the Austrian media. A cross-
national view would indeed contribute valuable information to research of Euroscepticism 
in the media, but it would exceed the scope of this thesis. The circumstances and reasons 
which could lead the media to adopt eurosceptic stances, as economic necessities to sell, 
will not be included in my empirical research either. They would constitute a different 
research question and again require different data. In my theoretical concept I, however, 
wanted to include in my theoretical concept all of the considerations which have been 
made up to now in the research field of Euroscepticism. The concept outlines the factors 
that an analysis of Euroscepticism should take into account.  
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Admittedly, there are weaknesses in this broadly designed concept. There are some 
empirical and theoretical overlaps between the different types of Euroscepticism. When 
investigating whether critique is directed at further European Integration, this could be 
easily matched to sovereignty-based concerns, as the latter basically also means that no 
further transfer of powers to the EU is desired. Critique directed towards the institutions of 
the EU might be considered the same as democratic Euroscepticism. Due to these 
theoretical overlaps of some of the dimensions, in some cases the same variables will be 
analysed for different types of Euroscepticism. This problem will become apparent in the 
next chapter containing information on how Euroscepticism in the Austrian media will be 
operationalised in this paper. The theoretical as well as the empirical overlaps can be 
disregarded to some extent, due to the different questions underlying the different 
dimensions of Euroscepticism. Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism will probably lead to the 
attitude that no further integration is desired, but the attitude critiquing further integration 
might also be due to other considerations rather than a sovereignty-based one, as for 
example democratic, ideological or utilitarian considerations. One dimension does not 
equal the other one in its substance. Even if the dimensions will be analysed with the same 
variables, this does not lessen the need to theoretically maintain these dimensions apart 
from each other. The same applies to the similar sounding dimension of democratic 
Euroscepticism and the critique of the institutional set-up of the EU.  
 
The idea to find a correlational pattern between eurosceptic considerations, as detected 
through Sørensen’s concept, and the objection to specific political processes of the EU or 
entities of the EU, present an additional line of research. In this thesis I will prescind from 
the idea of conducting empirical analysis on these structures. Every consideration 
mentioned in Sørensen’s model could lead to any of the objections to specific parts and 
processes of the EU. Therefore, I doubt that logical correlations between these eurosceptic 
attitudes could be found. Additionally, other data-related problems would become an issue 
when trying to do such a correlation analysis. It has become apparent through my 
empirical analysis that with some dimensions the cases available are few. This would make 
any correlation analysis insignificant, also through the before mentioned overlaps, that for 
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some dimensions I will have to use the same variables correlational analysis is rendered 
useless. 
When talking about Kopecky’s and Mudde’s category of specific support and Taggart’s and 
Szczerbiak’s dimension of Soft Euroscepticism, it has to be mentioned again that only the 
opposition to the future integration of major policy areas and the critiquing of policies 
which belong to major policy areas should be taken into account. Otherwise the 
conceptualisation runs the risk of being over-inclusive. 
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5. Data and Methods 
5.1 Media Survey PIREDEU  
The need to employ research in the ambit of mass media is mentioned by Schmitt. He 
suggests that the best way to conduct investigations on the contents and mechanisms of 
European public opinion and political will formation is through research on the 
communication surrounding EP Elections. This way, he states, we will be able to see which 
contents are actually conveyed by the media and under which circumstances news 
coverage impacts the political opinion and political behaviour of the citizens. (Schmitt, 
2002: 526). The same point of view is shared by Ekkehard Mochmann, who states in an 
article discussing international comparative election research, that he finds it important to 
include data of Media research when analysing citizens’ opinions (Mochmann, 2002: 234). 
As already mentioned, most of the research on Euroscepticism up until now has focused on 
citizens’ attitudes or party politics. Not only in the ambit of election research but also 
research in the area of public support for the EU and the integration process, media 
analysis is a vital ingredient to every investigation on public opinion.   
 
With the creation of PIREDEU and their media survey, quantitative research has become 
an option to find out more about the dispersion and characteristics of Euroscepticism in 
the different Member States. The data gathered in the course of the PIREDEU project was 
collected in a time frame of three weeks preceding the European Parliament Elections 
(EPE) in 2009. The specific timeframe was chosen, as it is expected, that the amount of 
news concerning the EU reaches a peak shortly before important dates, such as the EPE. 
Using a common Codebook the same 60 variables were analysed for all major newspapers 
and newscast in all EU Countries. This way, comparative cross-national analysis will be 
possible as soon as the data will be released. The news outlets in Austria included the 
“Kronen Zeitung”, “Der Standard”, “Die Presse”, “Salzburger Nachrichten”, “Kleine 
Zeitung”, “ORF Zib 1” and “ATV News”.  
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Concerning the validity of data, one can differentiate between internal and external validity 
(Wimmer and Dominick, 2006: 27 ff). The internal validity of the data has not yet been 
confirmed by PIREDEU, but hopefully it will be possible to get some evidence on this until 
the end of 2010. Concerning the external validity of the data set I will be using, some limits 
have to be set. First, obviously the data only includes information gathered within the 
Austrian media. Second, the time frame of the three weeks preceding the EP election has 
influenced the data in such way, that the quantity of information given on EU-related 
topics is probably higher in the sample than under „normal“ circumstances. This way, it 
was possible to gain some deeper knowledge on how the EU and the EP Election were 
reported on if they were. The quantity of stories which concerned these topics, cannot be 
generalised to be valid for the whole year of 2009, for example. For my analysis of 
Euroscepticism this will have no impact. 
 
It will become clear with some of the variables analysed in my empirical research that the 
number of valid cases is sometimes really low. This gives, on first sight, the impression of 
not providing us with significant data. When public opinion research is conducted 
employing data gathered in questionnaires, it might be true that one cannot generalise the 
outcomes for all citizens of a country when only a minimum responded to a question. With 
the data gathered within the PIREDEU Media Study the context is different. The time 
frame obviously sets a specific limit to the generalisation of the data, as mentioned before, 
but for the rest it can be said that all articles in the newspapers and newscasts considered 
were coded. If the number of cases with some variables is low, this is due to the simple fact 
that there were only so many cases in the news outlets during these three weeks.  
 
Obviously such a broadly designed data set as the PIREDEU Media Study cannot provide 
the perfect variables for every analysis focused on a specific phenomenon. In contrast, it 
very well provides the necessary data to enable the investigation in a lot of different areas of 
interest concerning the EU and European Parliament Elections. With regards to the 
analysis of Euroscepticism and the variables, I would like to suggest some improvements 
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for future media studies carried out with the same Codebook (the variables I will be using 
in my analysis will be outlined in detail in the next chapter).  
 
First, the information on how the handling of the EU in economic issues was assessed in 
the stories, presents an important variable to every analysis of Euroscepticism. The same 
applies to the question whether the stories indicated who should be handling economic 
issues, the national governments or the EU. Unfortunately, in the Codebook both of these 
evaluations were only to be coded if the story had been labelled with the topic code 
“economic conditions”. In reality though there were a lot of topic codes which were 
designed for topics falling under the category of economic issues but being more specific as 
the topics “interest rates”, “SingleMarket/Common market”, “Inflation”, “Unemployment”, 
“National employment policies”, “Stock market and its developments (shares, bonds, AEX, 
DAX, Dow Jones etc.)”, “Business (companies, banks, industry, mergers, manufacturing)”, 
“Bankruptcy of business, companies, banks (specifically)”, “Debt (public debt of a state, a 
community etc.)”, “Taxes”, “Trade (international trade), trade deficits”, “Wages and 
Earnings”, “Effect of Euro on the Economy”, “Effects of financial crisis on domestic/ EU/ 
global economy (e.g. competitiveness, demand and supply, consumption, business 
climate)”.7 Coders were asked to always code the topics as specific as possible. So when the 
story in question handled some kind of economic issue but a more specific topic than 
“economic condition” could be found, it was not coded whether the story evaluated the EU 
handling of this issue negatively or not, and to whom the story contributed the 
responsibility of the economic issue in question. A lot of valid information was lost by the 
design of this question and the filter attached to it. Secondly, I miss a variable asking 
whether the story in question handled the topic of national identity and European identity. 
It would be of interest to know whether according to the article or story in question, one of 
these identities constitutes a threat to the other. Identity issues have caused a multitude of 
debates in the course of European integration and the enlargement process. This makes it, 
                                                      
7 The Codebook of the PIREDEU Media Study and the corresponding Appendixes,  which include a.o. a list 
of topic codes, can be accesed, after free registration, through the Homepage of PIREDEU: 
http://www.piredeu.eu/.  
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in my opinion, indispensible to include this aspect in a complete media study on the 
coverage of European issues. The third critique which I would have to mention, is that the 
only topic concerning the policy area of social politics in the Codebook, is the evaluation of 
health care in the media. The integration of policy areas traditionally under the control of 
the social welfare state is one of the big fields of debate in the discussions surrounding the 
future trajectory of European integration. Through the Codebook of the PIREDEU Media 
Study, no comprehensive analysis is possible to assess how the media reported on the EU 
handling of social issues and whether further integration in this policy area was desired or 
not. For future studies I would suggest to include topics such as pension systems and 
labour market policies to find out how the media reported on social policy issues.  
 
5.2 Operationalisation of Euroscepticism in the 
media 
Through several variables of the Codebook7 I will be able to operationalise the possible 
theoretical dimensions of Euroscepticism. I will mention it in the following outline on the 
operationalisation of my concept, were I recoded or computed variables from the original 
data set to fit the purpose of my analysis.  
 
5.2.1 Operationalisation of eurosceptic concerns 
For the utilitarian approach I will use variables from the Codebook estimating whether the 
following things were mentioned in stories in the Austrian media.8 
! “Does the author of or any kind of actor mentioned in the article express/argue that 
one’s country has had any kind of disadvantages from the EU (generally or specific) 
                                                      
8 For the dimension of utilitarian Euroscepticism “The question ‘Did your country benefit from membership 
of the EU?’ has prominently figured in this research (note from the author: of instrumental Euroscepticism); 
it is clearly linked to the cost-benefit research tradition or the so-called instrumental approach.” (Lubbers and 
Scheepers 2005 p. 224). 
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or that the situation in one’s country has been negatively affected or will 
(potentially) be negatively affected because of the EU?”  
! “Does the author of or any kind of actor mentioned in the article express/argue that 
one’s country has had any kind of benefits from the EU (generally or specific) or 
that the situation in one’s country has improved or will (potentially) improve 
because of the EU?”  
In the course of my empirical analysis of the data I merged the above-mentioned variables. 
The new variable can show us how the distribution of this evaluation was and where such 
an evaluation was included in the stories of the news outlets coded.  
 
Democratic Euroscepticism in the Austrian media will be analysed through the following 
variables: 
! “Does the story mention any aspect related to the state of democracy in the EU, and 
if so, how is it evaluated? E.g. does the story mention whether the European Union 
is democratic/transparent or undemocratic/in transparent?”9  
! “Does the story evaluate the European Parliament and if so how?”9 
As third variable to assess which impression the stories coded gave of the democratic state 
of the EU, I took into consideration the following evaluations: 
! “Explicitly (only if the story or somebody in the story says so): Does the story make 
any kind of negative reference to a particular distance or ‘gap’ between the EU and 
its citizens? Example: If a story refers to citizens feeling not represented/understood 
by the EU (also includes citizen indifference, disinterest towards the EU).”  
! “Explicitly (only if the story or somebody in the story says so): Does the story make 
any kind of positive reference to he (sic!) responsiveness of the EU towards the 
citizens? Example: If a story mentions that the EU makes efforts to address 
                                                      
9 I recoded the initial variable and eliminated the values “not applicable/not mentioned” and “mentioned but 
not evaluated”, as for my analysis this variable will only be of interest if such an evaluation took place.  
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concerns of citizens (responding, reaching out, listening to EU citizens, etc.; also 
includes Plan D for Democracy initiative by European Commission)”  
These two variables for me represent two opposites. I computed them into one variable, 
telling us whether stories mentioned that there is a gap between citizens and the EU or 
whether the EU actually takes in the concerns of the population and is aware of them. This 
new variable will include how often one of these stances was conveyed by the media. 
 
In my sovereignty-based analysis I will evaluate the following variables: 
! “Who, according to the story, if mentioned at all, should mainly be responsible for 
handling, working on or taking care of a topic?”  
The answer possibilities included national governmental actors as well as EU-level actors. 
These questions were asked only if the first, the second or the third major topic of a news 
story was about European integration, globalisation or environment. I coded the three 
variables asking this question in each case for the first, the second and the third topic of the 
story into one variable. It is not important for my analysis of sovereignty-based 
Euroscepticism which prominence the topic in question had when such an evaluation took 
place.  
The answer possibilities in the original variable included different kinds of national actors 
(governmental, non-governmental, non-political) and EU or EU-related actors.  I recoded 
the categories to only divide between national actors in general, including all the different 
categories of national actors, and EU actors, as these are the main values which matter for 
the analysis of sovereignty-based Eurosceptcisim. 
There were two further variables asking about the level at which certain issues should be 
handled: 
! “Who according to the story, if mentioned at all, should mainly be responsible for 
handling, working on or taking care of the economic conditions?”  
! “Who according to the story, if mentioned at all, should mainly be responsible for 
handling, working on or taking care of immigration?”  
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Again with the two latter variables I collapsed the answer possibilities to just include the 
information whether “national actors” or “EU-level actors” should handle the topic in 
question. To get a complete picture of the evaluation of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism I 
also collapsed in a second analysis the three above-mentioned variables concerning 
different topics into one variable. After having had a look at whether differences exist 
concerning the disposition to cede power to the EU-level between the different policy 
areas, I wanted to get an overall picture of this disposition concerning matters of 
international concern.  
As mentioned earlier, it is important to choose topics for the evaluation of sovereignty-
based Euroscepticism, which as such can be generally denoted as being of international 
nature. Otherwise, the objection to cede sovereignty to the EU-level might not be a sign for 
a eurosceptic stance but only present a logical evaluation of the level at which the issue in 
question should be handled. I therefore considered Dalton’s and Eichenberg’s national-
difficulty criterion (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998). For the variables I will analyse for 
sovereignty-based Euroscepticism, the difficulty the Austrian nation-state would find when 
trying to solve the issues at the national level, is quite high (though, as stated earlier, there 
is no clear consensus in the literature on which policy areas can be handled more 
effectively at an supranational level (De Winter and Swyngedouw, 1999: 61). The objection 
to cede power within these areas therefore constitutes, for me, one dimension of 
Euroscepticism.  
 
And finally, the data set of the PIREDEU Media Study will enable me through this question 
to examine ideological or social Euroscepticism: 
! “Does the story indicate whether the national government or EU-level government 
has had a positive or negative impact on health care?”  
Unfortunately, this was the only variable in the Codebook concerning social issues and will 
be the only variable I can take into account for my analysis of ideological or more 
specifically social Euroscepticism. The picture I will get with this analysis of this type of 
Euroscepticism will therefore not be a complete one. 
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Data-related problems will also inhibit me from including the dimension of identity-based 
Euroscepticism in my empirical analysis. The PIREDEU Codebook does not contain the 
necessary information to operationalise this concrete dimension of Euroscepticism. No 
variable of the Codebook treated the question of whether news stories raised issues 
concerning European identity or about how European identity was reported about. 
 
5.2.2 Operationalisation of the objects of critique 
The objection to the EU in general will be assessed through the following variable: 
! “Does the story evaluate the EU and if so how? ‘The EU’ here refers to the EU as a 
political institution as such, not to single, more specific institutions such as the EP 
or the EC.”  
 
Whether critique is directed at an institution of the EU will be operationalised as follows: 
! “ Does the story evaluate the European Parliament and if so how?”10 
 
The critiquing of specific policies and policy areas will be addressed through the following 
variables: 
! “Does the story indicate whether the national government or EU-level government 
has had a positive or negative impact on national economic conditions?” 
! “Does the story indicate whether the national government or EU-level government 
has had a positive or negative impact on immigration?” 
! “Does the story indicate whether the national government or EU-level government 
has had a positive or negative impact on interest rates?” 
                                                      
10 This was the only variable of the Codebook asking how a specific EU institution had been evaluated in the 
media. Therefore, the knowledge of how the EP was evaluated will have to answer the purpose of knowing 
whether critique was directed towards main EU institutions. 
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! “Does the story indicate whether the national government or EU-level government 
has had a positive or negative impact on health care?” 
I recoded the variables to get one variable telling me whether in any of these policy areas 
the EU was criticised for their impact on the topic in question. This will indicate whether 
specific policies were criticised. It will not matter for this analysis which policy area was the 
focus of critique.11  
 
The last question which would lead me to find out at which entities and processes of the 
EU critique in the media was directed at, would be whether objections to further European 
integration were brought forward. At the same time, this would be the second question, 
after the analysis of whether specific EU policies had been criticised, that would constitute 
an indicator for Soft Euroscepticism in the media. Unfortunately, it will not be possible 
here to analyse the same variable as for the dimension of sovereignty-based 
Euroscepticism. The Codebook only provides the general information whether in specific 
policy areas (globalisation, environment, EU integration, immigration and economic 
issues) integration was desired or not according to the media. The broad character of these 
topics does not provide a clear enough structure to divide between policy areas that already 
have been integrated and those that have not. To gain knowledge on this second indicator 
for Soft Euroscepticism, it would be necessary to only consider the rejection of further 
integration. It is true that for the investigation on the objects of critique, the objection to 
European integration in general would provide valuable information. But at the same time 
I intent to employ the concept of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism throughout this analysis. 
Therefore, I refrain from analysing the objection to European integration in general in this 
part of my analysis and it will not be possible to operationalise part of my analysis on the 
objects of critique and Soft Euroscepticism. If someone, in another context, is interested in 
the objection to European integration in general, I can refer to the analysis of sovereignty-
                                                      
11 I eliminated the answering possibilities asking how the impact of the national government was evaluated 
as this will not either affect the analysis of how the EU was evaluated.  
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based Euroscepticism. This analysis will be conducted in the first part of my empirical 
analysis concerning eurosceptic concerns and evaluations.  
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6. Empirical Analysis  
In a first step I will analyse the above-mentioned variables, corresponding to the different 
dimension of Euroscepticism, for the Austrian ,edia in general. In a second step I will 
evaluate the variables in cross tabulations with a variable telling us to which news outlet the 
content coded can be ascribed to.  
 
There are two aspects which should be analysed to assess whether one type of 
Euroscepticism is represented more strongly in the media than another one. One is, how 
often negative impressions directed at the EU have been conveyed within the topic in 
question (in total numbers or the percentages relative to the total number of stories coded). 
A second one is, how often critical statements have been made in comparison to positive 
statements that would balance the impression given. Readers might have a more negative 
impression of a specific issue the more often it is criticised in the media. But this negative 
impression might be again weakened when a lot of positive statements are made too. I will 
first assess these two factors individually, as both ways to interpret the data are valid and 
will contribute different aspects to the analysis. To get comprehensive numbers that 
include both factors in one analysis, I will later compute an additive index to weigh the 
actual number of negative references with the positive ones. I will therefore subtract the 
positive from the negative statements in each dimension; this will result either in a number, 
which represents the surplus of negative or the surplus of positive statements for the 
dimension in question. Then these numbers will be put in relation to the whole of the 
balanced evaluations. The results will show how strong each dimensions has been 
represented in the media with regards to all relevant evaluations when the positive and 
negative statements have been weighed.  
 
I will first offer a mere descriptive analysis when looking at the dimensions of 
Euroscepticism as they present themselves in the Austrian media. Later on, when it is 
discernable which dimensions of Euroscepticism are strongest and which were represented 
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only to a weaker degree, I will proceed by offering interpretations and explanatory 
information. 
6.1 Euroscepticism in the Austrian media landscape 
The following statistical outputs always have to be seen in relation to the number of cases 
in which the topics in question were addressed or evaluated. In the tables containing the 
statistical data concerning each of the dimensions, it will be shown how many valid cases 
were available. As a general frame of reference, I will indicate that 2151 stories were coded 
in all Austrian news outlets analysed in the PIREDEU Media Study. 1139 stories 
mentioned the EU during the three weeks preceding the EPE 2009 and within these, 600 
mentioned the EP Elections concretely.  
 
6.1.1 Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations in the Austrian media 
- a four-dimensional analysis 
6.1.1.1 Utilitarian Euroscepticism 
To assess the degree to which utilitarian Euroscepticism could be found in the Austrian 
news outlets, I will look at the variables telling me whether the stories coded gave the 
impression that Austria has had disadvantages or benefits from the EU.  
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Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Benefits 
 
62 2.9 31.2 
Disadvantages 
 
119 5.5 59.8 
Both 
 
18 0.8 9.0 
Total 
 
199 9.3 100.0 
Missing System 
 
1.952 90.7  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 2: Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
Most articles did not contain a utilitarian evaluation of the costs and benefits of the 
membership in the EU. In 2151 stories such an evaluation took place 199 times. If assessing 
whether the EU brought more benefits or more disadvantages, the percentage of articles 
and newscasts saying that Austria has had disadvantages from the membership in the EU 
was, with 59.8%, twice as high as the percentage of articles mentioning benefits, with 
31.2%.  9% of the stories, which contained a utilitarian evaluation, took a neutral position, 
mentioning both benefits and disadvantages. Taking only the negative references into 
account, in all 2151 articles and stories evaluated, 6.4% of all articles contained the 
utilitarian evaluation that Austria has had some kind of disadvantages from the 
membership in the EU.  These are quite striking findings. Though it has been mentioned in 
public discussion that Austria is a rather eurosceptic country, one should expect the media 
to evaluate the membership rather positively in a cost-benefit calculation of the 
membership. For smaller countries it is usually an advantage to be a EU member. Austria 
has no specific natural resources and is dependent on the economic cooperation with 
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neighbouring countries. A utilitarian based evaluation by experts or journalists should tend 
to respond positively to the European Union.12 
 
6.1.1.2 Democratic Euroscepticism  
The dimension of Euroscepticism will first be analysed through the question how the state 
of democracy was evaluated in the news outlets coded. 
 
State of democracy 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid negative 
 
26 1.2 35.1 
rather negative 
 
35 1.6 47.3 
balanced/mixed 
 
8 0.4 10.8 
rather positive 
 
4 0.2 5.4 
Positive 
 
1 0.0 1.4 
Total 
 
74 3.4 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.077 96.6  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 3: State of democracy 
                                                      
12 Also concerning the more controversial topic of the advantages and disadvantages of the Eastern 
Enlargement for Austria researchers states that: “Despite higher net contributions to the EU, the expanded 
macroeconomic activity swells tax bases, allowing more generous transfers to households without increasing 
public depth.” Keuschnigg, C. and Kohler, W. (2002) "Eastern Enlargement of the EU: How Much Is It 
Worth for Austria?" Review of International Economics 10(2): 324-342. 
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The results show a clear tendency in the evaluation of the state of democracy in the media. 
If the state of democracy was evaluated, as happened in 74 articles, the evaluation was 
mostly negative. If we combine the articles saying that the state of democracy was negative 
or rather negative, we get a total of 82.4 %. In contrast, only 6.8% of the articles evaluating 
the state of democracy gave a favourable impression.  
 
Later on, coders were asked to determine more specifically whether stories about the EU 
contained an evaluation of the European Parliament, one of the core democratic 
institutions of the EU.  
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Evaluation EP 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Negative 
 
41 1.9 44.1 
rather negative 
 
17 0.8 18.3 
balanced/mixed 
 
15 0.7 16.1 
rather positive 
 
17 0.8 18.3 
Positive 
 
3 0.1 3.2 
Total 
 
93 4.3 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.058 95.7  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 4: Evaluation EP 
 
The same pattern as with the variable concerning the state of democracy is discernable. If 
there was an evaluation of the EP, it was negative in 62.4% of the cases. The number of 
articles evaluating the EP rather positively, 21.5%, was, however, higher than with the state 
of democracy in the EU. This may be due to the fact that the data gathered was collected 
three weeks previous to the EP Elections and some articles may have featured campaigns to 
remind citizens of the importance to vote and the importance of the EP. But apparently, if 
democracy in the EU and one of the main democratic components of the EU, the EP, were 
evaluated, the EP received better marks in the media than the general state of democracy. It 
seems that the role the EP plays in the decision-making mechanisms of the EU is thought 
of as being more democratic than other components of the decision-making process. 
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The perceived distance between the EU and its citizens can also be a marker for democratic 
Euroscepticism. Coders were asked to assess whether the article or story in question gave 
the impression that there was a perceived distance between the citizens and the EU.  
 
 Gap/Responsiveness 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Distance/Gap 
 
110 5.1 85.3 
Responsiveness 
 
16 0.7 12.4 
Both mentioned 3 0.1 2.3 
Total 
 
129 6.0 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.022 94.0  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 5: Gap/Responsiveness 
 
Around 10% of all articles about the EU (in total 1139 of the 2151 coded articles concerned 
EU issues) mentioned that there was ‘gap’ between the EU and its citizens. This would 
mean that every tenth article which concerned a topic related to the EU made a reference 
to some kind of mal-functioning of democracy, as citizens should be able to understand 
and be informed about the decision taken at EU-level. In contrast, 1.5% of all articles 
related to the EU mentioned that the EU made efforts to address the concerns of citizens.  
 
Comparing the positive references (mentioning some kind of responsiveness of the EU 
towards its citizens) to the negative references (making a reference to a ‘gap’ between the 
EU and its citizens), the relation is 12.4% to 85.3% respectively. 
 
When taking all of the variables together which were taken into account for the dimension 
of democratic Euroscepticism, 229 negative references concerning some aspect of 
democracy in the EU were made.  
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6.1.1.3 Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
 
 Should handle: Globalization, European integration, Environment 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid National level actor 6 0.3 33.3 
EU-level actor 
 
12 0.6 66.7 
Total 
 
18 0.8 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.133 99.2  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 6:  Should handle: Globalization, European Integration, Environment 
 
As one can see, the number of stories in the newspaper about globalisation, European 
integration or the environment mostly did not contain a specific indication towards who 
should be mainly handling the topics in question. But if we take into account the 18 stories 
that were evaluated in this way, most of these stories did not display sovereignty-based 
Euroscepticism. In around 2/3 of all cases, the stories stated that EU-level actors should be 
handling the topic in question. In contrast, only 1/3 of all stories attributed responsibility 
in the policy areas of EU integration, globalisation and environment to the national level. 
The results of this analysis show that a majority of the articles evaluated in this way did say 
that EU-level actors should handle these topics. This may not seem surprising taking into 
account the international character of the issues analysed. European integration and 
globalisation are per se issues of international concern and usually require some kind of 
supranational cooperation. With the topics concerning environmental issues, the problems 
to be discussed and decided upon could be of national relevance. In the case of Austria, e. 
g. the transit traffic is debated mainly on a national level, but even the issue of transit traffic 
requires an international solution and affects not only one nation. But exactly this is why 
we evaluate these topics. If stories displayed sovereignty-based concerns within these 
topics, these stories can be clearly denoted as conveying a eurosceptic stance. One third of 
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the stories including an evaluation of who should handle the topics of European 
integration, environment or globalisation can be in conclusion categorised as conveying 
sovereignty-based Euroscepticism. 
 
Other policy areas, which in general can be categorised as being of international character, 
are economic conditions and immigration. Some might consider immigration as a national 
issue, as in public opinion immigration is mostly discussed in national and not in 
European terms. But national cooperation is necessary to handle immigration; even more 
so in the EU, where national borders do not exist anymore. 
 
 Should handle: Economic issues 
 Frequency   Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Any national actors 8 0.4 57.1 
EU or EU-related 
actors 
6 0.3 42.9 
Total 
 
14 0.7 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.137 99.3  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 7: Should handle: Economic issues 
 
The stories discussing economic conditions and making a statement about who should be 
mainly handling economic conditions were rather balanced in saying that the national 
government or EU-level actors should do so (though only 14 stories conveyed such an 
opinion). Still, if such an evaluation took place, the decision-making competence was 
attributed in 8 stories to national level actors and in only 6 stories to EU-level actors. 
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 Should handle: Immigration issues 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Any national actors 10 0.5 76.9 
EU-level actors 3 0.1 23.1 
Total 
 
13 0.6 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.138 99.4  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 8: Should handle: Immigration issues 
 
When there was an assessment about who should handle the topic of immigration, there is 
a tendency showing that national actors should do so. 10 stories gave the impression that 
national level actors should handle immigration issues. In only 3 of the media reports 
where such an evaluation was made, the story assessed that EU-level actors should be 
responsible for the policy area of immigration. The following assumption can be made 
considering the results: when issues are more important to the Austrian public, as it could 
very possibly be the case with immigration, the media stress more that sovereignty should 
be kept at a national level. With immigration there is a certain amount of sovereignty-
based Euroscepticism showing. When economic issues are addressed, which usually are 
also very important to citizens, the opinion in the Austrian media seems to be divided. 8 
stories say that national governmental actors should be mainly handling economic issues 
and 6 say that EU-level actors should do so. This may be due to the fact that, again, if issues 
are very important to the public, there is a tendency to say that the decision-making power 
should be kept at a national level. But especially with economic issues and the recent 
economic crisis, it should be clear that Austria would be worse off if decisions would be 
taken individually by Austrian governmental actors. With the topics of EU integration, 
globalisation and environment sovereignty-based Euroscepticism was lowest.  
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 Should handle: Overall 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid National level actor 24 1.1 54.5 
EU-level actor 
 
20 0.9 45.5 
Total 
 
44 2.0 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.107 98.0  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 9: Should handle: Overall 
 
In this table we can see that in an overall analysis of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism, 
disregarding the different issues and policy areas where the evaluations took place, the 
results show that the disposition conveyed by the media to transfer powers to the EU-level 
comes close to being 50%. The interpretation has to keep in mind though that we only took 
into consideration topics of international character, where it would not be surprising either 
if no sign of sovereignty-based Euroscepticism was showing.  
 
6.1.1.4 Ideological (-Social) Euroscepticism 
In this analysis I want to test whether the mentioning of “too little Social Europe” 
constituted a point of critique on the European Union. Therefore, I will have a look at a 
variable which asked whether the EU’s impact on health care had been positive or 
negative.13 
  
                                                      
13 I will only consider the cases were the EU was evaluated, therefore I eliminated the cases of stories were the 
national government was evaluated on terms of the health care system. 
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 Health care 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid EU governance has 
had a negative 
effect 
1 .0 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.150 100.0  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 10: Health care 
 
If there was an evaluation in the media concerning the topic of health care, a negative effect 
of the EU was assessed in one case. The number of cases where a story in the news 
mentioned that EU governance has had a positive or no effect was nil. The health care 
system is one of the main components of a social system. If this topic was not mentioned 
very often in articles or stories having something to do with the EU, this also means that 
the health care system, and in consequence the social system, are not yet considered 
European issues. To have though a complete analysis of social Euroscepticism, one would 
have to be able to rely also on variables on how labour market policies, pension politics, 
social insurance policies and decisions concerning public services have been evaluated with 
regards to the EU.  
 
6.1.1.5 Additive index and interpretation of results  
When comparing the relation between “positive” and “negative” references in the above 
analysed dimensions of Euroscepticism, the pattern shows that, when evaluations were 
made on a utilitarian-, democratic-, sovereignty-, or ideological basis, the amount of 
negative references in comparison to positive ones was highest for democratic 
Euroscepticism. The tendency was even stronger with the variable concerning the topic of 
health care (negative references directed towards the EU were 100%), but I will have to 
prescind from giving these results a major significance. To really evaluate social or 
ideological Euroscepticism, the evaluation of other variables concerning social issues would 
  
 
 
 
 
 
78 
be necessary. Also when an evaluation took place only in one case, the results cannot be 
given a major importance. The next type of Euroscepticism where the negative tendency 
was strongest, was utilitarian-based Euroscepticism. The articles which assessed a negative 
effect of the EU on Austria were nearly twice as high (with 63%) as the ones assessing that 
Austria has had benefits from the EU (with 37%). With sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
the evaluation was rather balanced. When we combine the results of all the policy areas 
where it was assessed whether national or EU-level actors should handle the topic in 
question (Environment, Globalisation, European integration, economy or immigration), in 
55.6% of the cases the stories indicated that national actors should do so. In contrast 44.3% 
called for the EU to handle the issue in question.  When only taking into account the total 
number of negative references, democratic Euroscepticism was strongest with 229 negative 
references. This was followed by the utilitarian evaluation of the cost and benefits of the EU 
with 119 stories assessing more disadvantages for Austria. The next dimension was 
sovereignty-based Euroscepticism with 24 negative evaluations, and last the evaluation of 
the EU’s impact on health care which was practically non-existent with only one case. 
What is already observable at first glance, is that in both ways in which the results can be 
interpreted (once comparing the negative to the positive evaluations within the dimensions 
of Euroscepticism itself, and once by only taking into account the negative evaluations and 
comparing the numbers between the dimensions) the same pattern is discernable, with 
democratic Euroscepticism being highest, followed by utilitarian Euroscepticism, and last 
coming sovereignty-based concerns and social (or ideological) Euroscepticism. 
 
To test for the accuracy of this mere observation, I will draw on an additive index to 
provide the numbers for an inclusive analysis. The additive index will take into account the 
balance of negative and positive evaluations within each dimension and the salience of the 
negative evaluations.14 When the number in the table refers to negative references this will 
be marked with a “(n)”, positive statements will be marked with a “(p)”.  
                                                      
14 The additive index will weigh the actual number of negative references with the positive ones. The positive 
statements are subtracted from the negative ones in each dimension; this will result either in a number which 
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Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
Utilitarian Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 119 – (p) 62 = (n) 57 /2.49 = (n) 23% 
Democratic Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 229 – (p) 41 = (n) 188 /2.49 =  (n) 75% 
Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 24 – (p) 21 = (n) 3 /2.49 = (n) 1% 
Ideological/Social Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 1 = (n) 1 /2.49 = (n) 0% 
  !=249   
Table 11: Additive index: Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
 
The numbers of the additive index support the observations made before. The strongest 
eurosceptic concern in the Austrian media was linked to democracy in the EU, both taking 
into account the balance of the negative and positive evaluations, as well as the salience of 
the negative evaluations. Democratic Euroscepticism presented ! of all eurosceptic 
concerns evaluated in this analysis. Second were utilitarian evaluations, presenting nearly 
" of the eurosceptic concerns in the Austrian media. Far behind came sovereignty-based, 
as well as ideological (or social) Euroscepticism, the latter being practically none existent 
(though again I should like to point out that additional variables would be necessary to 
analyse this last dimension in a comprehensive way). 
The results of my empirical analysis draw in many cases a different picture of the types of 
Euroscepticism dominating in the Austrian media than what would be expected when 
looking at the relationship between Austria and the EU.  
Democratic Euroscepticism showed to be strongest when analysing which eurosceptic 
concerns dominated in the media. For this dimension no clear expectations could be 
formulated beforehand, concerning specifically the case of Austria. The strong presence of 
democratic Euroscepticism in the Austrian media might reflect the much-mentioned gap 
between the EU and its citizens in public discourse and scientific research in general. The 
                                                                                                                                                                   
represents the surplus of negative or the surplus of positive statements for the dimension in question. These 
numbers will be put in relation to the whole of the balanced evaluations. 
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critique that the decision-making process in the EU is too intransparent to allow citizens to 
form an opinion about the decisions taken at the EU-level is popular. Additionally, the 
time frame of the media analysis (the three weeks leading up to the EPE 2009) might have 
led to the fact that the elections and the democratic state of the EU were especially in the 
focus of attention. One of the dimensions of Euroscepticism, where the actual results of my 
empirical analysis contradict my expectations, is the one regarding utilitarian-based 
Euroscepticism. The question whether Austria has had any kind of disadvantages from the 
EU figured in the media quite prominently with 12% of EU-related stories conveying such 
an impression. This actually stands contrary to what one might have expected taking into 
account the specific Austrian situation. As mentioned in my chapter on Euroscepticism in 
Austria, the advantages that arise for Austria from being a member of the European Union 
seem apparent from a rational point of view. Austria lies in the heart of Europe and profits 
strongly from the Economic and Monetary Union, especially now after the accession of the 
Eastern European Member States. Through the decision-making mechanism which 
dominated in the European Union for a long time, and the rotating Presidency of the 
European Council, Austria is given a stronger voice in the international system than a 
small country like Austria would have otherwise. However, it is true that decision-making 
mechanisms have been changing and thus the impression that Austria has a stronger voice 
through the EU might have been revised in the media. Still, taking the other reasons 
mentioned into account, one would expect utilitarian Euroscepticism to be low in the 
Austrian media. In contrast to utilitarian concerns, sovereignty-based and ideological 
Euroscepticism (or more concretely social Euroscepticism) proved to be practically non-
existent in the media. In general, with these two dimensions the Austrian media conveyed 
neither positive, nor negative evaluations very often. This indicates that both topics were 
not at the centre of reporting on the EU. These too are unexpected findings. The initial 
debates surrounding the accession of Austria to the EU were dominated by the fear that the 
neutrality-status of Austria would be in danger. It was believed that Austria would no 
longer be able to determine autonomously in which actions it would participate and in 
which it would not. Also, the interference by the European Union in Austrian domestic 
political affairs, concretely the sanctions against the coalition government of the ÖVP and 
the FPÖ, raised reservations against the EU and was seen with indignation by many. This 
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historical background would rather speak for a strong than a weak dimension of 
sovereignty based Euroscepticism. For the dimension of social Euroscepticism on the one 
hand, having a long tradition of social welfare, Austrians might have reservations against 
the more neo-liberal politics of the European Union. On the other hand though, it is just 
until recently that integration of social policies has become an issue. Thus, this might still 
not be a relevant topic in public discussion. The results of the empirical analysis proved the 
second point to be accurate, at least for the topic of health care. Due to the lack of variables 
analysing news coverage on further social issues, the results do not display a 
comprehensive analysis of social Euroscepticism. 
 
6.1.2 The objects of critique in the Austrian media  
6.1.2.1 Critique directed at the EU in general  
With V26 coders were asked to assess if the story in question contained an evaluation of 
the EU in general. I eliminated the possibilities to answer the answers, “mentioned but not 
evaluated” and “not mentioned”. 
 
 Evaluation EU 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Negative 
 
118 5.5 49.2 
rather negative 
 
50 2.3 20.8 
balanced/mixed 
 
29 1.3 12.1 
rather positive 
 
31 1.4 12.9 
Positive 
 
12 0.6 5.0 
Total 
 
240 11.2 100.0 
Missing 
 
System 
1.911 88.8  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 12: Evaluation EU 
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Such an evaluation was made in 240 cases of 2151 coded stories. If the EU was evaluated as 
a political institution in general. 70 % of all the stories gave a negative impression about it. 
The number of articles expressively saying that they thought negatively about the ‘political 
institution EU’. was even higher than the number of articles articulating themselves more 
moderately giving a rather negative impression of the EU. This variable seems to indicate 
that. though the EU was only evaluated in 21% (240 stories out of 1139 EU related stories) 
of the stories talking about the EU. if such a thing happened. the general impression the 
stories gave of the EU was negative in a majority of the cases.  
 
6.1.1.2 Critique directed at EU institutions 
Concerning the question whether critique was directed at an EU institution. we will have to 
revert again to the variable asking if and how the EP was evaluated in the news outlets. This 
variable will not provide us with a full picture of how the institutions of the EU were 
evaluated. as we would have to have data on how the European Council. the Council of the 
European Union (the Council). the European Commission. the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors have been 
evaluated. Due to a partial overlap. with regards to content between the dimensions of 
democratic and institutional Euroscepticism. the same variable will be analysed and the 
results will provide the same pattern. If there was an evaluation of the EP. it was mostly 
negative. with 62.4% of the cases.  
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 Evaluation EP 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Negative 
 
41 1.9 44.1 
rather negative 
 
17 0.8 18.3 
balanced/mixed 
 
15 0.7 16.1 
rather positive 
 
17 0.8 18.3 
Positive 
 
3 0.1 3.2 
Total 
 
93 4.3 100.0 
Missing System 
 
2.058 95.7  
Total 
 
2.151 100.0  
Table 13: Evaluation EP 
 
6.1.2.3 Critique directed at specific policies 
To see whether critique was directed towards the EU-handling of specific policy areas. I 
took into consideration variables asking how the story in question evaluated the handling 
of EU-level actors in the ambits of economic. immigration. health care or climate change 
issues.15  
  
                                                      
15 For my analysis it is not of interest how the national government was evaluated, therefore I eliminated 
these evaluations from my statistical outputs. 
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Policy Effect of EU 
  
Frequency Percent 
                     Valid 
Percent 
Valid EU positive effect 4 .2 23.5 
EU negative effect 12 .6 70.6 
EU positive and 
negative effect 
1 .0 5.9 
Total 17 .8 100.0 
Missing System 2134 99.2   
Total 2151 100.0   
Table 14: Policy effect of EU 
 
The EU was assessed to having had a negative impact in one of these major policy areas in 
12 of the stories. A positive evaluation was provided in 4 stories. Thus the number of 
articles criticising specific policies decided at the EU-level was higher than the number of 
stories making positive references to the effect the EU had in the policy areas of economy, 
immigration, health care or climate change. 
 
6.1.2.4 Additive index and interpretation of results 
The following conclusion can be drawn on the analysis of the objects of critique in the 
Austrian media when the balance between positive and negative evaluations is taken into 
account: The strongest tendency can be detected with the critique directed at the EU in 
general with 70% negative evaluations to around 18% positive evaluations. This would 
speak for a more radical type of Euroscepticism in the Austrian media. The next strongest 
dimension is the one critiquing specific policy areas. Here we can see that in 70.6% of the 
cases negative effects of the EU in specific policy areas was assessed.  In comparison, there 
were more positive statements (23,5%), than with the relation between positive and 
negative evaluations of the EU in general. Critique directed towards the institutions of the 
EU, which would again present a more radical type of scepticism, followed with the 
relation of 62.4% negative evaluation versus 21.5% positive evaluations.  
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Again I will have to complete the comparative analysis by taking a look at the total 
numbers of negative references between the different types of Euroscepticism analysed in 
this section of my empirical research. Additionally I will interpret the results of the additive 
index, which combines both relevant factors. This will give us an additional notion of the 
dimension of the different eurosceptic stances and enable us to conclude finally whether 
Euroscepticism in the Austrian media can be categorised as being harder or softer. 
 
Most negative references could be coded with the critique of the EU in general, 7.8% of the 
2151 stories coded contained such a stance. Following this type of Euroscepticism, the EP 
was criticised in 2.7% of all articles. Finally, in only 0.6% of the stories, a negative effect of 
the EU’s handling of specific policies was assessed. These results clearly indicate that 
Euroscepticism in the Austrian media is more of a radical type, critiquing either the EU in 
general or one of its major institutions and pillars, the EP.  
 
The following additive index will take into account both the balance of the evaluations as 
well as the salience of the negative and positive statements.  
 
 
Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
Evaluation EU in general 
 
(n) 168 – (p) 43 = (n) 125 /1.71 = (n) 73% 
Evaluation EU institutions (EP) 
 
(n) 58 – (p) 20 = (n) 38 /1.71 =  (n) 22% 
Critiquing specific policy outcomes 
 
(n) 12 – (p) 4 = (n) 8 /1.71 = (n) 5% 
  !=171   
Table 15: Additive index: Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
 
The additive index shows that by far the most unbalanced or most salient critique in the 
Austrian media was directed at the EU in general, holding a total of 73% of all weighed 
evaluations. Following this, there was critique directed at the EP which was represented in 
22% of the stories. Critique directed at specific policy outcomes showed to be lowest with 
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5%. This tendency can present more of a threat to the EU. With the entities and processes 
the critique at the EU was directed at in the media, the data showed that the attitudes 
towards the EU in the Austrian media can be categorised as Hard Euroscepticism. The EU 
in general and one of its major institutions, the EP, were considerably more often criticised 
than specific policies the EU had been handling. This might seem harsh and unexpected 
considering the apparent advantages the membership in the EU has for Austria. At the 
same, time this actually fits the characteristics of media reporting which often opts for the 
more attention seeking headlines and contents. The low amount of Soft Euroscepticism in 
comparison to Hard Euroscepticism might be a sign that the critique of the media is 
usually not based on the discussion of specific policy outcomes but has a more general 
focus. The findings fit into the picture of the media being more polemic and simplifying 
without rationally evaluating specific outcomes. These characteristics of media reporting 
are usually even more strongly ascribed to yellow press news outlets. Therefore, the 
assumption can be made that the yellow press “Kronen Zeitung” could be a major 
contributor to the eurosceptic tendencies in the Austrian media in general. The analysis on 
this aspect will be conducted in the following chapter. 
 
6.2 Euroscepticism in the different Austrian media 
outlets 
For somebody acquainted with the Austrian media landscape and having followed the EPE 
campaign 2009 in the news, the connection between the eurosceptic contents in the 
Austrian media and the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” will be made easily. An empirical analysis 
of whether a majority of the stories conveying some sort of eurosceptic content can, in fact, 
be linked to the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” will follow in this chapter. As already mentioned, 
the Austrian media landscape is especially characterised by the significant role of the “Neue 
Kronen Zeitung”, which in the following I will simply refer to as the “Kronen Zeitung”. A 
vast majority of the population in Austria reverts to this specific outlet to obtain their 
information. The importance of the “Kronen Zeitung” concerning its range of coverage 
within the Austrian population is exceptional in the whole of Europe. When interpreting 
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my findings on Euroscepticism in the different media outlets, I will therefore put a special 
focus on the reporting of the “Kronen Zeitung”. The “Kronen Zeitung” can be additionally 
described as a yellow press and tabloid news outlet. The most notable quality newspapers 
are “Der Standard” and “Die Presse”, with the first one being more inclined to the left 
political spectrum and the latter one being considered close to the more conservative 
political forces. Both “ORF ZiB” and “ATV News” are news broadcast, “ORF ZiB” of the 
state-owned ORF channel, while ATV represents a private channel. As  general 
information, I included tables showing the amount of articles in each newspaper or news 
broadcast mentioning EU related topics below. For the analysis of different types of 
Euroscepticism in the different media outlets, I will always provide a table that shows 
which news outlet was responsible for which percentage of a specific attitude towards the 
EU. Following this, I will provide individual tables for every news outlet, showing how the 
distribution concerning different attitudes towards the EU was within the news outlet. 
  
 
 
Standard * Mention EU 
 no yes  Total 
Count 164 243 407 
% Mention EU 40.3% 59.7% 100.0% 
Table 17: Der Standard * Mention EU 
  
News outlets * Mention EU  
 no yes  Total 
Standard Count 164 243 407 
% Mention EU 16.4% 21.3% 19.0% 
Presse Count 114 252 366 
% Mention EU 11.4% 22.1% 17.1% 
Kronen Zeitung  Count 164 299 463 
% Mention EU 16.4% 26.3% 21.7% 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten  
Count 78 79 157 
% Mention EU 7.8% 6.9% 7.3% 
Kleine Zeitung  Count 194 193 387 
% Mention EU 19.4% 16.9% 18.1% 
ORF ZIB  Count 194 54 248 
% Mention EU 19.4% 4.7% 11.6% 
ATV News Count 91 19 110 
% Mention EU 9.1% 1.7% 5.1% 
Total Count 999 1139 2138 
% Mention EU 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 16: News Outlets * Mention EU 
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Presse * Mention EU 
 no yes  Total 
Count 114 252 366 
% Mention EU 31.1% 68.9% 100.0% 
Table 18: Presse * Mention EU 
 
Kronen Zeitung * Mention EU 
 no yes  Total 
Count 164 299 463 
% Mention EU 35.4% 64.6% 100.0% 
Table 19: Kronen Zeitung * Mention EU 
 
Table 21: Kleine Zeitung * Mention EU 
 
ORF ZIB * Mention EU 
 no yes  Total 
Count 194 54 248 
% Mention EU 78.2% 21.8% 100.0% 
Table 22: ORF ZIB * Mention EU 
Salzburger Nachrichten * Mention EU 
 no yes  Total 
Count 78 79 157 
% Mention EU 49.7% 50.3% 100.0% 
Table 20: Salzburger Nachrichten * Mention EU 
Kleine Zeitung * Mention EU 
 no yes  Total 
Count 194 193 387 
% Mention EU 50.1% 49.9% 100.0% 
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ATV News * Mention EU  
 no yes  Total 
Count 91 19 110 
% Mention EU 82.7% 17.3% 100.0% 
Table 23: ATV News * Mention EU 
 
The special focus in my comparative analysis of eurosceptic contents in the different media 
outlets will lie on the “Kronen Zeitung”, due to the special role it has in the Austrian media 
landscape and due to its eurosceptic stances. Ideally it would be possible to conduct an 
analysis of all the media outlets employing again the concept I used before when analysing 
Euroscepticism in the Austrian media landscape in general (first analysing the different 
dimension of eurosceptic concerns and secondly looking at which entities and processes 
the critique is directed at). After having analysed, in a first and more superficial attempt, 
the cross-tabulations related to each of the dimensions of Euroscepticism and to the news 
outlets, I soon came to the conclusion that no valid comparative analysis between the 
different types of Euroscepticism and the different media outlets is possible. Where cases 
were already low before, when attributed to the corresponding news outlets, the number of 
cases available for comparative analysis is lower still. This will have two consequences for 
my present empirical analyses. First, in the cases were the variables coded presented us 
with enough cases, I will still conduct my comparative analyses without it, however, being 
possible to give a complete analysis as outlined in my initially used concept and without the 
possibility to draw the conclusions related to it (whether the eurosceptic reporting of one 
or the other news outlet conveys a more radical or general objection to the EU and 
European integration or whether it concerns more specific aspects). It will still be possible 
to discern the general tendencies of each news outlet without presenting a comprehensive 
analysis according to the concept. Secondly, I will again draw on the computation of 
additive indices to get a comprehensive picture of the strength of different types of 
Euroscepticism in the different Austrian media outlets. I will mainly focus on the coverage 
of the “Kronen Zeitung”, as the prior analysis of some variables has shown that the 
“Kronen Zeitung” seems to have the most eurosceptic potential. To be able to compare 
  
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
these findings, I will also compute the additive indices for all other news outlets combined 
(excluding the “Kronen Zeitung”). This analysis will be conducted regarding once again all 
dimension of Euroscepticism, as presented in my concept. With the prior analysis of 
Euroscepticism in the different media outlets I refrained from analysing every dimension 
of Euroscepticism, as developed in my concept due to the low number of cases I could find 
with some dimension in some news outlets. As the number of cases corresponding to the 
different dimensions of Euroscepticism in the “Kronen Zeitung” has shown to be highest, it 
will make sense to conduct again a comprehensive analysis of all dimensions of my concept 
when focusing on the same. As the cases of all other news outlets will be combined in one 
analysis, this will also result in a number of cases higher than when looking at every news 
outlet individually and an analysis of all the dimensions will be possible.  
 
I will first have a look at the dimension of utilitarian Euroscepticism and its distribution 
between the different media outlets. The variables referred to for this analysis focused on 
whether it was mentioned that Austria has had benefits or disadvantages from the EU. The 
variables were fitted together to provide a full picture of whether more disadvantages or 
more benefits were mentioned in the different news outlets (if such an evaluation was 
included in the stories). 
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News outlets * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Standard Count 26 14 8 48 
% Benefits/Disadv 41.9 % 11.8 % 44.4 % 24.1 % 
Presse Count 14 6 2 22 
% Benefits/Disadv 22.6 % 5.0 % 11.1 % 11.1 % 
Kronen Zeitung  Count 8 91 2 101 
% Benefits/Disadv 12.9 % 76.5 % 11.1 % 50.8 % 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten  
Count 3 1 2 6 
% Benefits/Disadv 4.8 % 0.8 % 11.1 % 3.0 % 
Kleine Zeitung  Count 9 5 4 18 
% Benefits/Disadv 14.5 % 4.2 % 22.2 % 9.0 % 
ORF ZIB  Count 1 2 0 3 
% Benefits/Disadv 1.6 % 1.7 % 0.0 % 1.5 % 
ATV News Count 1 0 0 1 
% Benefits/Disadv 1.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.5 % 
Total Count 62 119 18 199 
% Benefits/Disadv 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 24: News outlets * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
Standard * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 26 14 8 48 
% Benefits/Disadv 54.2 % 29.2 % 16.7 % 100.0 % 
Table 25:  Der Standard * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
Presse * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 14 6 2 22 
% Benefits/Disadv 63.6 % 27.3 % 9.1 % 100.0 % 
Table 26: Presse * Benefits/Disadvantages 
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Kronen Zeitung * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 8 91 2 101 
% Benefits/Disadv 7.9 % 90.1 % 2.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 27: Kronen Zeitung * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
Salzburger Nachrichten * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 3 1 2 6 
% Benefits/Disadv 50.0 % 16.7 % 33.3 % 100.0 % 
Table 28: Salzburger Nachrichten * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
Kleine Zeitung * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 9 5 4 18 
% Benefits/Disadv 50.0 % 27.8 % 22.2 % 100.0 % 
Table 29: Kleine Zeitung * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
ORF ZIB * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 1 2 0 3 
% Benefits/Disadv 33.3 % 66.7 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 30: ORF ZIB * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
ATV News * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages Both Total 
Count 1 0 0 1 
% Benefits/Disadv 100.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 31: ATV News * Benefits/Disadvantages 
 
From the cross-tabulation it is discernable that the “Kronen Zeitung” was the news outlet 
which featured the majority of all articles mentioning that Austria has had disadvantages 
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from the EU with 76.5%. Also within the news outlet “Kronen Zeitung”, the balance 
between benefits and disadvantages being mentioned was most inclined to mentioning 
disadvantages if compared to other news outlets. It can be concluded thus very quickly that 
here the “Kronen Zeitung” presented us with the most eurosceptical profile.  
 
The most euroenthusiastic news outlets, when it came to giving the impression that Austria 
has had either benefits or disadvantages from the EU, were “Der Standard” and “Die 
Presse”. “Der Standard” held the strongest percentage of articles mentioning benefits but 
“Die Presse” was the newspaper which, in relation to the negative statements, had the 
highest number of positive statements. This means that when it came to a utilitarian 
evaluation the tendency in “Die Presse” was most favourable for the EU, but in total 
numbers “Der Standard” mentioned more benefits. Additionally, it is easily observable that 
both TV newscasts prescinded mostly from evaluating the EU on a utilitarian basis. 
 
The number of stories which included evaluations concerning some aspect of democracy in 
the EU was high enough to make comparative analysis between the different media outlets 
meaningful. Therefore, the variables asking how the state of democracy was evaluated, how 
the European Parliament was evaluated and whether the story assessed that there is a 
distance or a gap between the EU and its citizens, will be analysed in the following. 
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News outlets * State of democracy 
 
negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/ 
mixed 
positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Standard Count 7 4 1 12 
% State of  democracy 11.5% 50.0% 20.0% 16.2% 
Presse Count 6 3 4 13 
% State of democracy 9.8% 37.5% 80.0% 17.6% 
Kronen Zeitung  Count 33 1 0 34 
% State of democracy 54.1% 12.5% .0% 45.9% 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten  
Count 4 0 0 4 
% State of democracy 6.6% .0% .0% 5.4% 
Kleine Zeitung  Count 4 0 0 4 
% State of democracy 6.6% .0% .0% 5.4% 
ORF ZIB  Count 3 0 0 3 
% State of democracy 4.9% .0% .0% 4.1% 
ATV News Count 4 0 0 4 
% State of democracy 6.6% .0% .0% 5.4% 
Total Count 61 8 5 74 
% State of democracy 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 32: News outlets * State of democracy 
 
Standard * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 7 4 1 12 
% State of democracy 58.3% 33.3% 8.3% 100% 
Table 33: Der Standard * State of democracy 
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Presse * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 6 3 4 13 
% State of democracy 46.2% 23.1% 30.8% 100% 
Table 34: Presse * State of democracy 
 
Kronen Zeitung * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 33 1 0 34 
% State of democracy 97.1% 2.9% 0.0% 100% 
Table 35: Kronen Zeitung * State of democracy 
 
Salzburger Nachrichten * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 4 0 0 4 
% State of democracy 100.0% .0% .0% 100% 
Table 36: Salzburger Nachrichten * State of democracy 
 
Kleine Zeitung * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 4 0 0 4 
% State of democracy 100.0% .0% .0% 100% 
Table 37: Kleine Zeitung * State of democracy 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
ORF ZIB * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 3 0 0 3 
% State of democracy 100.0% .0% .0% 100% 
Table 38: ORF ZIB * State of democracy 
 
ATV News * State of democracy 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 4 0 0 4 
% State of democracy 100.0% .0% .0% 100% 
Table 39: ATV News * State of democracy 
 
The number of stories evaluating the state of democracy in the EU negatively or rather 
negatively was highest with the articles of the “Kronen Zeitung”. Following the “Kronen 
Zeitung” was “Der Standard” and subsequently “Die Presse”. In comparison, when we have 
a look at the positive evaluations of the state of democracy, we can see that this number was 
generally low throughout all news outlets. When the media conveyed a positive impression, 
this was the case either in “Der Standard” or “Die Presse”. We can thus say that all news 
outlets tended to evaluate the EU badly with respect to the state of democracy, but again 
the “Kronen Zeitung” was most radical in doing so. 
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News outlets * Evaluation EP 
 
negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/ 
mixed 
positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Standard Count 3 6 6 15 
% Evaluation EP 5.2% 40.0% 30.0% 16.1% 
Presse Count 4 6 5 15 
% Evaluation EP 6.9% 40.0% 25.0% 16.1% 
Kronen Zeitung  Count 44 0 1 45 
% Evaluation EP 75.9% .0% 2.2% 48.4% 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten  
Count 0 2 0 2 
% Evaluation EP .0% 13.3% .0% 2.2% 
Kleine Zeitung  Count 4 0 6 10 
% Evaluation EP 6.9% .0% 30.0% 10.8% 
ORF ZIB  Count 1 0 2 3 
% Evaluation EP 1.7% .0% 10.0% 3.2% 
ATV News Count 2 1 0 3 
% Evaluation EP 3.4% 6.7% .0% 3.2% 
Total Count 58 15 20 93 
% Evaluation EP 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 40: News outlets * Evaluation EP 
 
Standard * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 3 6 6 15 
% Evaluation EP 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% 100% 
Table 41: Der Standard * Evaluation EP 
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Presse * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 4 6 5 15 
% Evaluation EP 26.7% 40.0% 33.3% 100% 
Table 42: Presse * Evaluation EP 
 
Kronen Zeitung * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 44 0 1 45 
% Evaluation EP 75.9% .0% 5.0% 100% 
Table 43: Kronen Zeitung * Evaluation EP 
 
Salzburger Nachrichten * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 0 2 0 2 
% Evaluation EP .0% 100.0% .0% 100% 
Table 44: Salzburger Nachrichten * Evaluation EP 
 
Kleine Zeitung * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 4 0 6 10 
% Evaluation EP 40.0% .0% 60.0% 100% 
Table 45: Kleine Zeitung * Evaluation EP 
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  ORF ZIB * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 1 0 2 3 
% Evaluation EP 33.3% .0% 66.7% 100% 
Table 46: Kleine Zeitung * Evaluation EP 
 
ATV News * Evaluation EP 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 2 1 0 3 
% Evaluation EP 66.7% 33.3% .0% 100% 
Table 47: ATV News * Evaluation EP 
 
Most negative references concerning the EP came from the “Kronen Zeitung” with 44 of 
stories conveying such an impression. In comparison, the rest of the negative evaluations 
towards the EP in the other outlets fluctuated between nil and four stories mentioning such 
a negative assessment of the EP. If we compare this to the positive evaluation of the EP, we 
can see that the “Kronen Zeitung” has the poorest balance between positive and negative 
evaluations of the EP and therefore seems to convey the most negative impression of the 
EP. Other news outlets seemed to give a more balanced impression of the performance of 
the European Parliament.  
 
The last indicator of democratic Euroscepticism concerns the assessment whether there is a 
particular gap or a distance between the EU and its citizens or if the EU tries to reach out 
to its citizens. 
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News outlets * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Standard Count 19 1 2 22 
% Gap/Responsiveness 17.3 % 6.3 % 66.7 % 17.1 % 
Presse Count 10 4 0 14 
% Gap/Responsiveness 9.1 % 25.0 % 0.0 % 10.9 % 
Kronen Zeitung  Count 63 9 0 72 
% Gap/Responsiveness 57.3 % 56.3 % 0.0 % 55.8 % 
Salzburger Nachrichten  Count 0 1 0 1 
% Gap/Responsiveness 0.0 % 6.3 % 0.0 % 0.8 % 
Kleine Zeitung  Count 8 0 0 8 
% Gap/Responsiveness 7.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 6.2 % 
ORF ZIB  Count 6 1 1 8 
% Gap/Responsiveness 5.5 % 6.3 % 33.3 % 6.2 % 
ATV News Count 4 0 0 4 
% Gap/Responsiveness 3.6 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 3.1 % 
Total Count 110 16 3 129 
% Gap/Responsiveness 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 48: News outlets * Gap/Responsiveness 
 
Standard * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 19 1 2 22 
% Gap/Responsiveness 86.4 % 4.5 % 9.1 % 100.0 % 
Table 49: Der Standard * Gap/Responsiveness 
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Presse * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 10 4 0 14 
% Gap/Responsiveness 71.4 % 28.6 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 50: Presse * Gap/Responsiveness 
 
Kronen Zeitung * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 63 9 0 72 
% Gap/Responsiveness 87.5 % 12.5 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 51: Kronen Zeitung * Gap/Responsiveness 
 
Salzburger Nachrichten * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 0 1 0 1 
% Gap/Responsiveness 0.0 % 100.0 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 52: Salzburger Nachrichten * Gap/Responsiveness 
 
Kleine Zeitung * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 8 0 0 8 
% Gap/Responsiveness 100.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 53: Kleine Zeitung * Gap/Responsiveness 
 
ORF ZIB * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 6 1 1 8 
% Gap/Responsiveness 75.0 % 12.5 % 12.5 % 100.0 % 
Table 54: ORF ZIB * Gap/Responsiveness 
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ATV News * Gap/Responsiveness 
 Gap Responsiveness Both Total 
Count 4 0 0 4 
% Gap/Responsiveness 100.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 
Table 55: ATV News * Gap/Responsiveness 
 
Within most news outlets, the tendency was that in a majority of the cases a gap was 
mentioned. Only in the “Salzburger Nachrichten” the balance was different, though only 
one story actually mentioned that the EU tries to reach out to its citizens. When we 
compare the amount of cases between the news outlets where such a distance or gap was 
mentioned, the “Kronen Zeitung” most often gave this impression to its readers. On the 
other hand, the same applies to the mentioning of responsiveness. Still we can say that the 
“Kronen Zeitung” conveyed the most negative evaluations concerning this issue and, 
within the news outlet itself, also the argument that there is a distance between the EU and 
the citizens dominated in comparison to its positive counterpart. 
The final variable which presents us with enough cases to evaluate its eurosceptic potential 
in the different media outlets, is the assessment of how the EU in general was evaluated in 
the stories coded. 
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News outlets * Evaluation EU 
 
negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/ 
mixed 
positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Standard Count 8 11 18 37 
% Evaluation EU 4.8% 37.9% 41.9% 15.4% 
Presse Count 11 8 13 32 
% Evaluation EU 6.5% 27.6% 30.2% 13.3% 
Kronen Zeitung  Count 123 4 4 131 
% Evaluation EU 73.2% 13.8% 9.3% 54.6% 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten  
Count 7 1 1 9 
% Evaluation EU 4.2% 3.4% 2.3% 3.8% 
Kleine Zeitung  Count 4 4 5 13 
% Evaluation EU 2.4% 13.8% 11.6% 5.4% 
ORF ZIB  Count 7 0 2 9 
% Evaluation EU 4.2% .0% 4.7% 3.8% 
ATV News Count 8 1 0 9 
% Evaluation EU 4.8% 3.4% .0% 3.8% 
Total Count 168 29 43 240 
% Evaluation EU 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0
% 
Table 56: News outlets * Evaluation EU 
 
Standard * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 8 11 18 37 
% Evaluation EU 21.6% 29.7% 48.6% 100% 
Table 57: Der Standard * Evaluation EU 
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Presse * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 11 8 13 32 
% Evaluation EU 34.4% 25.0% 40.6% 100% 
Table 58: Presse * Evaluation EU 
 
Kronen Zeitung * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 123 4 4 131 
% Evaluation EU 93.9% 3.1% 3.1% 100% 
Table 59: Kronen Zeitung * Evaluation EU 
 
Salzburger Nachrichten * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 7 1 1 9 
% Evaluation EU 77.8% 11.1% 11.1% 100% 
Table 60: Salzburger Nachrichten * Evaluation EU 
 
Kleine Zeitung * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 4 4 5 13 
% Evaluation EU 30.8% 33.8% 38.5% 100% 
Table 61: Kleine Zeitung * Evaluation EU 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
106 
ORF ZIB * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 7 0 2 9 
% Evaluation EU 77.8% .0% 22.2% 100% 
Table 62: ORF ZIB * Evaluation EU 
 
ATV News * Evaluation EU 
 negative/ 
rather negative 
balanced/mixed positive/ 
rather positive 
Total 
Count 8 1 0 9 
% Evaluation EU 88.9% 11.1% .0% 100% 
Table 63: ATV News * Evaluation EU 
 
The preceding results are confirmed by the present cross-tabulation. The “Kronen 
Zeitung” contained 73,2% of all negative evaluations of the EU. Still, “The Kronen Zeitung” 
did not convey most positive evaluations to balance the impression given; only 3.1% of the 
stories in the “Kronen Zeitung” evaluating the EU in general gave some kind of positive 
impression. “Der Standard”, followed by “Die Presse”, gave the most positive impressions 
of the EU in general. All other news outlets mostly did not contain any evaluation of the 
EU in general and therefore cannot be categorised as conveying eurosceptic stances with 
regard to this aspect.  
 
6.2.1 Additive indices and interpretation of results 
The present empirical results of the analysis of Euroscepticism in the different media 
outlets do not give a full picture of different types of Euroscepticism according to my 
previously employed concept. It is still possible to give a summary of the general tendencies 
that can be discerned in the different media outlets. Both TV newscasts, as well as the 
“Kleine Zeitung” and the “Salzburger Nachrichten”, generally did not contain a lot of 
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evaluations of the EU. “Der Standard” was usually most positively inclined towards the EU 
(except for the assessment of whether there was a distance or gap between the EU and its 
citizens, where the “Kronen Zeitung” contained the most positive statements), sometimes 
sharing this conviction with “Die Presse” or being followed closely by the latter. When 
evaluating the state of democracy in the EU, all news outlets tended to give a negative 
impression. The “Kronen Zeitung” mostly contained the highest percentage of all negative 
evaluations of the EU or aspects concerning the EU. Additionally, the “Kronen Zeitung” 
gave, in all cases, a significantly more negative impression of the EU and of aspects 
concerning the EU than a positive one. Therefore the “Kronen Zeitung” can be categorised 
as the most eurosceptic news outlet in Austria when the above-evaluated variables are 
taken into account. It is also perceivable from the empirical results that both TV newscasts 
did not contain a lot of evaluations concerning the EU. For the ORF news “ZiB” one could 
relate this with the fact that this is a state owned TV channel and both governing parties 
(SPÖ-ÖVP) currently have no specific eurosceptic profile. Also, governing parties in 
general tend to be rather euroenthusiastic than eurosceptic (Hix, 2007: 136 ff). Governing 
parties are usually inclined to defending decisions taken by the EU, as they themselves were 
involved in the decision-making process. That the same tendency can also be found in the 
news cast of the private ATV channel would suggest to relating the results to the 
characteristics of TV news reports in general, independently from the specific channel. A 
separate research would have to investigate the actual reasons for this low profile of 
euroscepticism (and of evaluations of the EU in general) in TV news outlets. One of the 
reasons could be the lower amount of content that can be embedded in TV newscasts. 
 
It seems clear from this comparative analysis that, compared to other news outlets, the 
“Kronen Zeitung” held the strongest percentage of stories conveying eurosceptic stances. 
To give us additional information of the apparently most eurosceptic news outlet in the 
Austrian media, I will again rely on my additive index to see which dimensions of 
Euroscepticism dominated in the “Kronen Zeitung”. With the additive index I will take 
into account both the balance between negative and positive evaluations and the salience of 
positive and negative evaluations. To be able to provide a comparative analysis, I will 
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compute an additive index for the news coverage of “The Kronen Zeitung” and 
subsequently for all other news outlets, this time excluding the stories of the “Kronen 
Zeitung”. This way it will be possible to see whether the reporting in the “Kronen Zeitung” 
distinguishes itself in salience and balance from the rest of the Austrian news outlets. I will 
here again employ my concept, looking first for eurosceptic concerns and then at the 
process and entities the critique is directed at. 
 
First we will have a look at the additive index of the eurosceptic concerns in all news outlets 
excluding the “Kronen Zeitung” and then conduct the same analysis for the “Kronen 
Zeitung”. 
 
All news outlets excluding Kronen Zeitung  
Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
 
Utilitarian Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 28 – (p) 54 
 
= (p) 26 
 
/0.85 
 
= (p) 30% 
 
Democratic Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 89 – (p) 31 
 
= (n) 58 
 
/0.85 
 
=  (n) 86% 
 
Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
 
(n) 19 – (p) 20 
 
= (p) 1 
 
/0.85 
 
= (p) 1% 
 
Ideological/Social Euroscepticism 
 
0 
 
 
 
/0.85 
 
= 0% 
   
!=85 
  
Table 64: Additive index: All news outlets excl. Kronen Zeitung * Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
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Kronen Zeitung 
Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
 
Utilitarian Euroscepticism 
(n) 91 – (p) 8 = (n) 83 /2.18 = (n) 38% 
 
Democratic Euroscepticism 
(n) 140 – (p) 10 = (n) 130 /2.18 =  (n) 60% 
 
Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism 
(n) 5 – (p) 1 = (n) 4 /2.18 = (n) 2% 
 
Ideological/Social Euroscepticism 
(n) 1 = (n) 1 /2.18 = (n) 0% 
  !=218   
Table 65: Additive index: Kronen Zeitung * Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations 
 
We can see that when all news outlets are evaluated excluding the “Kronen Zeitung”, the 
democratic dimension is the only one, which in balance and salience turns out to be 
eurosceptic. With utilitarian, sovereignty-based and ideological concerns the news outlets 
excluding the “Kronen Zeitung” seem to be euroenthusiastic to a stronger or weaker 
extent. All in all, we can see that in all news outlets excluding the “Kronen Zeitung”, only 
democratic Euroscepticism is present in the sense that the negative statements exceeded 
the positive ones, and therefore represents also the strongest Eurosceptic dimension in this 
analysis.  
 
In the “Kronen Zeitung” all evaluations turn out to be negatively biased. Democratic 
Euroscepticism seems to be the strongest concern. This fits to the analysis of all other news 
outlets where democratic Euroscepticism was strongest, as well as the only dimension 
where eurosceptic concerns dominated the coverage. In contrast, concerning the 
dimension of utilitarian Euroscepticism, were the other news outlets turned out to be 
euroenthusiast, the “Kronen Zeitung” conveyed the second strongest eurosceptic stance. In 
the “Kronen Zeitung” all dimensions prove to convey Euroscepticism to some degree. With 
sovereignty-based and ideological Euroscepticism this tendency is as slight as the positive 
tendency concerning these dimensions in the other news outlets. Thus, the latter two types 
of Euroscepticism appear to be represented similarly in the Austrian media landscape in 
general. 
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It becomes apparent that the tendency in the Austrian media landscape in general is so 
similar to the one of the “Kronen Zeitung” individually, because the “Kronen Zeitung” 
actually is responsible for most negative evaluations of the EU in the Austrian media. If we 
take the results of the additive index where the “Kronen Zeitung” is excluded, we can see 
that in the other news outlets the news coverage seems to be most often either balanced or 
even euroenthusiastic, as it is the case with the utilitarian evaluation of the EU. The bigger 
amount of negative evaluations directed at the democratic status of the EU and the lack of 
positive evaluations balancing this impression can nevertheless also be found in the rest of 
the Austrian news outlets. A possible reason for the high presence of democratic 
Euroscepticism in the media might be the time period in which the data was collected, as I 
already mentioned earlier. It seems logical that, prior to EP elections, topics connected to 
the state of democracy in the EU could be more strongly at the centre of media coverage. 
 
Secondly, the additive index will be employed to see at which entities or processes of the 
EU the critique was dominantly directed. This analysis will be conducted, firstly, for 
Austrian news outlets, excluding the “Kronen Zeitung” and, secondly, for the “Kronen 
Zeitung” individually. This will enable me to draw conclusions on whether Euroscepticism 
in the “Kronen Zeitung” can be categorised as being “harder” or “softer” and how the 
results differentiate themselves from the rest of the news outlets. 
 
All news outlets excluding Kronen Zeitung  
Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
 
 
Evaluation EU in general 
(n) 45 – (p) 39 = (n) 6 /0.13 = (n) 46% 
 
Evaluation EU institutions (EP) 
(n) 14 – (p) 19 = (p) 5 /0.13 = (p) 38% 
 
Critiquing specific policy outcomes 
(n) 2 – (p) 4 = (p) 2 /0.13 = (p) 15% 
  !=13   
Table 66: Additive index: All news outlets excl. Kronen Zeitung * Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
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Kronen Zeitung 
  Hard and Soft Euroscepticism   
 
Evaluation EU in general 
(n) 123 – (p) 4 = (n) 119 /1.72 = (n) 69% 
 
Evaluation EU institutions (EP) 
(n) 44 – (p) 1 = (n) 43 /1.72 =  (n) 25% 
 
Critiquing specific policy outcomes 
(n) 10 – (p) 0 = (n) 10 /1.72 = (n) 5.8% 
  !=172   
Table 67: Additive index: Kronen Zeitung * Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
 
We can again observe that news outlets other than the “Kronen Zeitung” even reported 
mostly in a rather euroenthusiastic sense. This again excludes one dimension which 
concerns the evaluation of the EU in general. In this dimension all other news outlets 
dominantly conveyed a negative impression too. We can nonetheless see that, with a 
balanced index of 6 negative evaluations concerning the EU in general, to 119 balanced 
evaluations in the “Kronen Zeitung”, this was still little. When we take into account all four 
dimensions, it seems that news outlets other than the “Kronen Zeitung” usually did not 
contain a lot of evaluations of the EU, and if, in most cases they seemed to be rather 
balanced or slightly positive.  
 
Within the news coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung”, the evaluation of the EU in general was 
most negative too, followed by the evaluation of the EP. Also the critique directed at 
specific policies turned out to be more frequent or least balanced in the “Kronen Zeitung”. 
In the other news outlets, these evaluations in balance and amount turned out to be slightly 
positive. Looking at the coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung”, it is clear that both types of 
Euroscepticism that would indicate a harder kind of Euroscepticism dominate. It seems 
striking though, that also in the rest of the media outlets the EU in general was evaluated 
mainly negatively.  
 
Eurosceptic reporting mostly came from the “Kronen Zeitung”, concerning both, 
eurosceptic concerns and evaluations, as well as the critique which was directed at specific 
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entities and processes of the EU. The fact that in every dimension of Euroscepticism, the 
“Kronen Zeitung” reported most critically, could be easily linked to the support of the 
eurosceptic MP Hans-Peter Martin. A daily column was featured by the same in the 
“Kronen Zeitung”. In his campaign Hans-Peter Martin focused on criticising the European 
Parliament and its members by accusing them of misappropriating EU moneys and 
working ineffectively. This might have strongly influenced the very negative impression 
conveyed by the “Kronen Zeitung” concerning the European Parliament and the state of 
democracy in the EU. When trying to assess the consequences of this type of coverage for 
the EU, on one side, critique directed at the state of democracy in the EU could be 
considered a positive thing. The call to improve democratic mechanisms should always be 
seen as a positive contribution to the debate of European Union politics. With this profile 
of strong democratic Euroscepticism, the “Kronen Zeitung” seems to fulfil one of the roles 
of the media, which is to act as a control mechanism. On the other side, the findings also 
show that the trust in the democratic state of the EU could be low within the readership of 
the “Kronen Zeitung”. A majority of the Austrian citizens revert to newspapers for political 
information is given the impression that the democratic mechanism of the EU cannot be 
trusted. This can have serious implication for the legitimacy of the EU. Ultimately, the EU 
is the political entity which is responsible for most of the legislation implemented in its 
Member States. Also when analysing utilitarian Euroscepticism, the “Kronen Zeitung” 
proved to report much more critically on the advantages and disadvantages of the EU for 
Austria than other news outlets. The latter actually proved to be rather euroenthusiastic 
than eurosceptic in balance and in salience. With sovereignty-based and social 
Euroscepticism the differences between the news outlets were not as distinctive. In the 
“Kronen Zeitung” negative references dominated, while in other news outlets positive 
statements presented a majority of the evaluations. In both cases though, these tendencies 
were very weak, resulting in a rather similar picture of sovereignty-based and social 
Euroscepticism. Another explanation for the stronger amount of Eurosceptic contents in 
the “Kronen Zeitung”, apart from being a yellow press news outlet, could be that in general 
yellow press papers tend to be read more by citizens from lower social classes. In previous 
studies it was found that citizens from lower social classes tend to be more eurosceptic 
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(Lubbers and Scheepers 2010 p.3) and Austrian citizens have tended to have particularly 
eurosceptic attitudes in comparison to the citizens of other European Union Member 
States. The “Kronen Zeitung” might thus be inclined to report in a eurosceptic way to 
support their readers opinion.  
 
The impact of eurosceptic news coverage on the Austrian citizens is strongly influenced by 
the range of coverage different news outlets reach. Having analysed both TV newscasts, 
they did not contain a significant amount of eurosceptical news coverage and compared to 
the print media more people get their information from TV news cast than from the print 
media. But when drawing on print media as a means to getting informed, a majority of the 
Austrian population chooses to read the “Kronen Zeitung”. The readership of other news 
outlets as “Der Standard” and “Die Presse” have been subjected to very little eurosceptical 
reporting, which additionally has often been balanced by positive reporting. To know that 
most eurosceptical news coverage came from the “Kronen Zeitung” also means that most 
readers of newspapers were exposed to this kind of coverage, which gives the results an 
additional significance. 
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7. Final Conclusion 
The importance to do research on Euroscepticism results from the need to know more 
about the wishes and concerns of the European population. This has various reasons: For 
one thing, the presence or absence of support for the European Union has an impact on the 
legitimacy of the political system of the EU. If citizens do not identify themselves with the 
political system that legislates most of the policies affecting their daily lives, they will tend 
to question these decisions. Also the acceptance of the principle of majority rule, one of the 
key mechanisms in every democracy, can be in danger if the there is no support for the 
political system in question. Secondly, the future of European integration has proven not to 
be solely in the hands of European elites anymore. The European population increasingly 
has objected to the elite-driven decision making process and to the pace with which 
European integration has been proceeding. The crisis of the EU, provoked by the 
ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty and its rejection in two of the European 
Union’s countries, has become a strong sign of these recent developments. To gain 
knowledge about the types of Euroscepticism that dominate in public discourse, it will be 
possible for political players to address these concerns and to take them into account when 
the future of the EU is planned. 
 
Most of the times when research attempted to learn more about Euroscepticism, this was 
done through the Eurobarometer or similar voter questionnaires. In my case, I chose to 
focus on the analysis of the media. Nowadays, mass media constitutes one of the main 
means through which political processes are communicated to citizens. This results in the 
fact that mass media is one of the most influential factors in political communication. The 
results that I gained from analysing Euroscepticism in the Austrian media will not 
necessarily reflect citizens’ opinions, but it will add another piece to the puzzle of 
Euroscepticism in Austria.  
 
My initial incentive to conduct research on Euroscpeticism in the Austrian media was 
inspired by the coding of the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” in the three weeks preceding the EPE 
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2009. This actually proved to be the first clue to my actual findings. Analysing the data 
collected, the “Neue Kronen Zeitung” proved to be by far the most eurosceptical news 
outlet. Both of my analyses on Euroscepticism supported these findings. First, the analysis 
of which eurosceptic concerns were presented in the media, and second, the analysis at 
which entities and processes the critique was directed at. The “Kronen Zeitung” proved to 
be responsible for a major part of the eurosceptic news coverage in the Austrian media. 
Having analysed both TV newscast, they did most often not convey any evaluations 
concerning the EU. “Der Standard” and “Die Presse” proved to report in a rather balanced 
way, most often the euroenthusiastic impressions even exceeding the eurosceptic ones 
slightly. Only democratic Euroscepticism dominated in all news outlets, still with the 
“Kronen Zeitung” holding the highest percentage of negative references towards 
democracy in the EU. The fact that in all news outlets democracy in the EU was evaluated 
negatively could be linked to the time frame in which the media study was conducted. The 
forthcoming EP Elections probably lead the media to focus on democracy and democratic 
mechanisms in the EU. An additional analysis with data collected in a different period of 
the EPs election cycle could provide the information on whether a correlational pattern 
exists between democratic Euroscepticism and EP elections being close. Still, these are 
worrying findings as the legitimacy of the political system of the EU is being questioned by 
this kind of news coverage. The readership of Austrian news outlets was given the 
impression that something is wrong with how democracy works in the European Union. 
Other findings, which turned out to be similar across the Austrian media landscape, were 
the ones related to sovereignty-based and social Euroscepticism. Both of these dimensions 
were practically not present in the Austrian media. In the discussion surrounding the 
accession of Austria to the EU, the critique was prominent that the loss of sovereignty 
would impede to uphold the neutrality status of the country. Also, many saw the 
intervention of the EU in domestic political affairs, explicitly, the sanctions against the 
coalition government of ÖVP and FPÖ, critically. I would therefore have expected 
sovereignty-based Euroscepticism to be higher in the Austrian media than other types of 
Euroscepticism. Social Euroscepticism showed to be low in the media too, but could only 
be analysed with one variable regarding the topic of health care. On the one hand, this 
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might be due to the lack of variables that were available in the data set to analyse this 
specific dimension. On the other hand, the findings might be explained by the fact that the 
integration of social policy areas has still not progressed a lot and thus this topic might not 
yet be a much discussed issue. Utilitarian-based Euroscepticism proved to be second 
highest in the analysis of Eurosceptic concerns and evaluations. These findings, however, 
have to be mainly ascribed to the news coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung”, as the analysis of 
Euroscepticism in the different media outlets showed. In the other news outlets, the 
amount of negative references concerning the benefits and disadvantages of the EU proved 
to be much lower and in most news outlets negative evaluations were even dominated by a 
higher amount of positive references (except for the ORF ZiB1 news).  
 
The second analysis was the analysis enquiring after which entities and processes of the EU 
the critique was mainly directed at. Critique was mainly directed at the EU in general, and 
one of its major institutions, the EP, rather than at specific policy outcomes. These findings 
indicate that so-called Hard Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2002: 7) dominated 
in the media, but, again, was especially strong in the “Kronen Zeitung”. The “Kronen 
Zeitung” reported in balance and salience more negatively on all of the four dimensions 
determining whether we can speak of Soft or Hard Euroscepticism. But clearly the critique 
directed at the EU in general and the EP dominated. For the other news outlets, the only 
dimension where the negative coverage exceeded the positive one in salience and balance, 
was the critique directed at the EU in general. Already with the evaluation of the EP, 
positive references were stronger. Still, the coverage of the ”Kronen Zeitung” and in part of 
the other news outlets indicated that critique was mainly directed at the EU in general and 
not so much at more specific aspects of the EU. This could be due to the characteristics of 
mass media and especially of yellow press news outlets. Mass media tends to simplify and 
go for the most attention seeking stories; even more so yellow press papers, which usually 
exhibit a more populist profile. This factor might constitute an important reason for 
eurosceptic news coverage in the media and could explain why the tendency apparently is 
to go directly for the critique of the EU in general rather than for specific policy outcomes. 
As I stated earlier in my chapter on why the media matters: Is it not easier for the media to 
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claim that the whole membership in the EU is at odds with national interest than to exactly 
depict which policy areas have been developing in favour of national interest and which 
have not? Some questions arise here as to what influences reporting of mass media. 
Interesting focuses of research could be to investigate whether the reporting of the media 
mirrors public opinion or whether the impressions conveyed by mass media are related to 
the special characteristics of modern journalism, as the necessity to produce attention-
seeking articles. 
 
In relation to the range of coverage of the news outlets, the coverage of the “Kronen 
Zeitung” has to be given special importance, as it is by far the most read newspaper in 
Austria. Most of the population, relying on newspapers to obtain information (Carmines 
and Huckfeldt, 1996: 241), is exposed to the coverage of the “Kronen Zeitung”. The fact 
that specifically this news outlet proved to be the most eurosceptic one, might not come as 
a surprise to persons acquainted with the European Parliament election campaign in 
Austria of 2009. The support of the “Kronen Zeitung” for the eurosceptic candidate Hans-
Peter Martin was not a subtle one. One of the questions which could not be assessed in this 
analysis, is to what extent the eurosceptic reporting of the “Kronen Zeitung” can be linked 
to the campaigning of Hans-Peter Martin or to the profile of the “Kronen Zeitung” as a 
yellow press news outlet.  
 
The quantitative data used in this analysis made it possible to take a broad range of news 
outlets and stories into account and to be able to offer a comprehensive and encompassing 
view of the whole media landscape in Austria. In future research on Euroscepticism in the 
media one could go more into detail by employing qualitative analysis. This could bring 
further information on the table concerning the contexts in which eurosceptical attitudes 
were mentioned. As soon as the complete PIREDEU media data set will be available, it will 
be possible to conduct comparative research on Euroscepticism in news outlets across the 
whole of Europe.  
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Data can be interpreted in a lot of different ways and findings will always vary according to 
the concept one is using.  Every critique on the concept and definition employed in this 
thesis is welcome and has the potential to add something to the research field of 
Euroscepticism. The analysis of Euroscepticism in the media still needs a lot of research. A 
first step is to conduct research on the concerns which drive Euroscepticism in the media 
and at what entities and processes of the EU the critique is directed at, which has been 
done in the present study for the case of Austria. A next step of analysis would be to 
conduct research on the contextual factors which influence mass media to find out the 
reason why some news outlets convey more eurosceptic stances than others and why some 
types of Euroscepticism are featured more strongly than others.  
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Abstract (English) 
Much has been discussed in the literature and in public about Euroscepticism. Often 
without the existence of a clear notion of what Euroscepticism actually is and which 
characteristics define the phenomenon. The present thesis, for one thing, is concerned with 
choosing an adequate definition of the term, as well as with developing a comprehensive 
concept of Euroscepticism. Previous research has shown that there is no such thing as ‘one 
kind’ of Euroscepticism. Critique concerning the EU might be directed at different aspects 
of the European Union. Also, different concerns and evaluations might lead to critiquing 
the EU. It is crucial to distinguish between the various types of Euroscepticism when 
research in the field of Euroscepticism is conducted. Without this, it will not be possible to 
learn what drives eurosceptic stances in the different Member States of the EU.  
 
Up until now, citizens’ opinions and the stances of political parties have been in the focus 
of research on Euroscepticism. Little is known by now on the attitudes mass media conveys 
concerning the EU. Mass media is the mean through which citizens register political events 
and with which they build their opinions concerning politics. It has been pointed out in 
literature that with the news coverage on the EU, the influence on public opinion is even 
bigger than in national contexts. This is due to the fact that knowledge on the decision-
making processes and politics of the EU is lower than on national issues. To match an 
increase in research interest in mass media, a European-wide media study has been 
conducted in the three weeks preceding the European Parliament Elections (EPE) 2009 
within PIREDEU (Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the 
European Union). The data collected in this study for Austria constitutes the basis for the 
empirical analysis of the present thesis.  
 
The present thesis tries to give an insight on which critical voices were most frequent in the 
Austrian media concerning the EU. Which entities and processes were in the focus of 
critique in the Austrian media and which concerns and evaluations were the most 
dominant? In the first part of the analysis, results show that in contrast to utilitarian, 
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sovereignty-based and ideological Euroscepticism, the most frequent type of 
Euroscepticism in the Austrian media was democratic Euroscepticism. These results have 
to be seen though with the time frame in mind within which the data was collected. During 
this time the democratic state of the EU as well as the EP have been much in the focus of 
reporting. Still, when democracy in the EU and related topics were discussed, the media 
conveyed a mostly negative picture.  
 
To assess whether Euroscepticism in the Austrian media can be described as being more of 
a harder or softer kind of Euroscepticism, I investigated whether critique was directed 
more at the EU in general or if ‘only’ specific policies were criticised. The empirical analysis 
indicates that the news coverage in the Austrian media mostly conveyed attitudes that can 
be categorised as Hard Euroscepticism. The main target of critique was the EU in general, 
in contrast, specific policies were only criticised very seldom. The latter findings might 
reflect specific characteristics of mass media reporting. Mass media tends to go for the 
most attention calling articles and to simplify complex processes.  These characteristics of 
mass media reporting can often be found even more distinctively in yellow press news 
outlets. This assumption could be supported by the findings of this thesis. By far, most 
eurosceptic news coverage came from the only yellow press newspaper in Austria, the 
Kronen Zeitung.  
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
Sowohl in der Öffentlichkeit als auch in der Literatur wurde viel über Euroskeptizismus 
gesprochen, jedoch hat man sich nie auf eine klare Definition des Terminus einigen 
können. Daher ist es Gegenstand dieser Diplomarbeit eine klare Definition von 
Euroskeptizismus herauszuarbeiten, sowie ein umfassendes Konzept von Euroskeptizismus 
zu entwickeln. Vorhergehende Studien zu diesem Phänomen haben gezeigt, dass es nicht 
nur eine Art von Euroskeptizismus gibt. Einerseits können verschiedene Aspekte der EU 
im Zentrum der Kritik stehen, andererseits können unterschiedliche Erwägungen und 
Bedenken dazu führen, dass euroskeptische Positionen angenommen werden. Um 
herauszufinden, warum in verschiedenen Ländern der EU euroskeptische Haltungen 
aufkommen, muss unabdingbar zwischen den verschiedenen Arten von Euroskeptizismus 
unterschieden werden. 
 
Bis vor kurzem wurde Forschung zu Euroskeptizismus vornehmlich in den Bereichen der 
Parteien- und Meinungsforschung betrieben. Es ist noch wenig über die Art und Weise 
bekannt, wie Medien über die EU berichten. Für die Bevölkerung der EU sind 
Massenmedien die Hauptquelle um Informationen über das politische Geschehen zu 
erhalten und stellen damit das Medium dar, das maßgeblich für die Meinungsbildung 
bezüglich politischer Themen verantwortlich ist. Weiters wurde in einschlägiger Literatur 
darauf hingewiesen, dass bei EU-spezifischen Themen die Medien einen besonders großen 
Einfluss haben. Grund dafür ist, dass das Wissen der EU-Bürger über politische 
Geschehnisse auf EU-Ebene meist geringer ist als über politische Geschehnisse auf 
nationaler Ebene, weshalb die Medien bei Berichten über die EU mehr Einfluss auf den 
Meinungsbildungsprozess haben. Um dem gesteigerten Interesse an Massenmedien als 
Forschungsfeld gerecht zu werden, wurde in den drei Wochen vor den 
Europaparlamentswahlen (EPE) 2009 von PIREDEU (Providing an Infrastructure for 
Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union) eine europaweite Medienstudie 
durchgeführt. Die daraus gewonnenen Daten dienen dieser Diplomarbeit als Grundlage für 
die empirische Analyse von Euroskeptizismus in den österreichischen Medien. 
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Im empirischen Teil der vorliegenden Diplomarbeit wird die Frage behandelt, welche Art 
von Kritik an der EU in den österreichischen Medien am häufigsten geäußert wurde.  
Dabei untersuche ich, welche Objekte und Prozesse der EU am häufigsten kritisiert wurden 
und welche Abwägungen dabei im Vordergrund standen. Der erste Teil der empirischen 
Analyse zeigt, dass im Gegensatz zum utilitaristischen, souveränitäts-bezogenen und 
ideologischen Euroskeptizismus, der demokratische Euroskeptizismus am dominantesten 
in den österreichischen Medien vertreten war. Allerdings muss bedacht werden, dass die 
analysierten Daten aus den drei Wochen vor den EPE 2009 stammen. Der demokratische 
Zustand der EU sowie das Europaparlament standen zu dieser Zeit besonders im Zentrum 
des öffentlichen Interesses. Nichtsdestotrotz war das Bild, das in den Medien über den 
Zustand der Demokratie vermittelt wurde, größtenteils negativ.  
 
Um festzustellen, ob Euroskeptizismus in den österreichischen Medien als eher „härter” 
oder „weicher” einzustufen ist, habe ich mich mit der Frage befasst, ob Kritik häufiger 
gegen die EU generell oder „nur“ gegen spezifische Richtlinien der EU gerichtet war. Die 
Ergebnisse der Analyse zeigen, dass man in den österreichischen Medien eher von “Hard 
Euroscepticism” als von “Soft Euroscepticism” sprechen kann, da die EU im generellen 
öfter kritisiert wurde als spezifische Richtlinien. Spezifische Charakteristika der 
Massenmedien mögen ebenfalls dazu beitragen, dass die österreichische Medienlandschaft 
ein solches Profil aufweist. Moderne Massenmedien tendieren dazu Berichte zu 
publizieren, die leicht Aufmerksamkeit erregen, sowie komplexe politische 
Zusammenhänge simplifiziert darzustellen. Oftmals sind diese Eigenschaften noch stärker 
in der Boulevardpresse gegeben, welches die Ergebnisse dieser Diplomarbeit bestätigen. 
Die einzige Tageszeitung Österreichs, die als Boulevardblatt angesehen wird, die „Kronen 
Zeitung“, wies auch den mit Abstand höchsten Anteil an EU-kritischen und 
euroskeptischen Berichten auf.  
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